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ABSTRACT 
 
JAN JOGIS-LAATS: Victim of merger mania? A qualitative study on German media 
giant Bertelsmann AG’s international strategies and growth opportunities 
(Under the direction of Dr. Frank E. Fee, Jr.) 
 
The developments in technology and resulting uncertainty in the global media marketplace 
have put media companies in search of successful business models. This qualitative research 
studied Bertelsmann AG, one of the world’s largest media conglomerates, and its 
realignment from an external-growth-oriented media company to a company concentrating 
on organic growth initiatives in core business areas. This research attempted to assess the 
company’s outlook and to evaluate, whether Bertelsmann’s repositioning could be seen as a 
model for success in a global economy. 
For this purpose, interviews with nine industry experts were conducted. The results show 
that Bertelsmann has a strong record in remaining profitable, but its conservative approach 
may pose a threat to its global top-tier position. But the findings also indicate that 
Bertelsmann’s approach could be a key for success in a global economy.  These findings can 
provide further studies a point of reference when evaluating the growth strategies of global 
media companies.    
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 CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 
The media and communications industries have witnessed an increasing globalization of 
markets and the consolidation of the companies active in those global markets during the last 
two decades. This process has been driven by the global developments in technology, 
politics, and economical regulations. As Pennsylvania State University professor Robert M. 
Frieden (2002) notes, more than 1.3 trillion U.S. dollars were invested in information and 
communication industries between 1996 and 2001, but the investment has shrunk 
substantially since then, “along with expectations about growth and new opportunities in 
converging information, communications, and entertainment industries” (p. 25). 
Among the companies at the forefront in the mass media industry during the period when 
expectations on the new, digital era were high has been Germany’s Bertelsmann AG, led by 
its chairman Thomas Middelhoff, who sought to create a globally recognized media giant 
through major acquisitions and convergence-related initiatives. After the collapse of the 
dotcom economy at the turn of the century and the losses suffered by many media players, 
Bertelsmann was one of the companies among the global leading media conglomerates to 
witness changes in the top management and strategic orientation. 
The purpose of this thesis project is to study how Bertelsmann has positioned itself 
strategically since the change of company’s leadership in 2002 and how industry experts see 
Bertelsmann’s future in the global media marketplace, mainly from the field of academia. 
Studying the company’s strategic positioning and evaluating its future can be seen as an 
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attempt to construct a model that is helpful when examining this and also other global media 
companies’ actions in the global marketplace during the current period of uncertainty in the 
industry. 
In terms of revenue, performance, structure, and strategy, Bertelsmann belongs among the 
six--or seven if one includes Japanese electronics giant Sony, which draws only a small 
portion of its overall revenues from media related activities--biggest and most influential of 
the global media conglomerates. It is a group that includes, in addition to Bertelsmann, 
French and Canadian based Vivendi Universal, Australian News Corporation, and American 
Time Warner and Disney. This list of global players has also traditionally included Viacom, 
which split into two companies,Viacom and CBS Corporation starting January 2006,and the 
above mentioned Sony, whose media revenues account for around 15% of its total revenue. 
Of this group of the seven biggest players, during the last 15 years the most active in global 
media merger and acquisition transactions have been Vivendi and Bertelsmann, which took 
part in 249 and 210 international acquisitions respectively between 1992 and 2002 (Chan-
Olmsted & Chang, 2003).  
Bertelsmann’s rise into the awareness of the wider public as one of the biggest global 
media conglomerates in the years around the turn of the 21st Century coincided with the 
period the company was led by Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Thomas Middelhoff. 
Middelhoff left his post in 2002 and the company’s majority shareholder, the Mohn family, 
replaced him with Gunter Thielen as CEO. The current chairman’s strategic approach,which 
enjoys the support of the company’s owners,can be described as focusing on the company’s 
core businesses or, in other words, adopting a back-to-basics approach (Ewing, 2004). At the 
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same time, Bertelsmann,a conglomerate with significant presence in markets throughout the 
Western world,has reiterated its goal to be among the leaders in the markets it operates. 
In light of changes in Bertelsmann’s leadership and management strategies adopted after 
2002, this thesis analyzes how a shift in strategy to focus mainly on existing core 
competencies reflects in the corporation’s performance and positioning in the top tier of the 
global communications marketplace. In addition to looking at the company’s current global 
position, this project attempts to evaluate the implications of Bertelsmann’s strategic 
management and positioning in the media marketplace on the company’s future success. 
Evaluating the future of Bertelsmann could also be seen as an attempt to build a basis for a 
theoretical model useful for positioning media companies in the global environment and in 
the global economy. Such a model is the first step toward a wider theoretical concept for 
evaluating the global media companies’ approaches and should be followed by studies 
focusing on other companies with their respective unique characteristics. 
In the form of a study conducted with the help of nine in-depth interviews, this project 
analyzes Bertelsmann’s performance in light of CEO Gunter Thielen’s notion that the “days 
of great leaps, blockbuster deals and billion-euro acquisitions are over for now” (Annual 
Report, 2002, p. 3). Yet there are authors who suggest that for any large corporation, meeting 
growth expectations and keeping a competitive advantage cannot be achieved merely by 
organic initiatives, i.e. growth excluding mergers, takeovers, and acquisitions (Ferrari et al., 
2003; Smit et al., 2005). Therefore Bertelsmann’s strategic positioning should be looked at in 
terms of its position in the global media marketplace and whether such a strategic approach 
can be seen as a key to success in the current period of uncertainty in the media industry. 
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To address those questions, this thesis project is divided into five chapters. The 
introductory first chapter is followed by a chapter with background information about 
Bertelsmann AG and its peers in the global media marketplace. The third chapter focuses on  
relevant literature, presents the research questions, and describes the method chosen for 
conducting this study. The methods section of this chapter also contains information about 
the participants and their recruiting and interview process, and addresses the reactivity and 
reflexivity issues of this qualitative research. I present the findings of the study in the fourth 
chapter and discuss the findings in the fifth chapter. Chapter V discusses the findings and 
ends with the conclusions together with suggestions for further research.  
  
CHAPTER II 
Background  
 
Bertelsmann’s rise from a European company with strong ties to Germany into a global 
media player with a notable presence in the United States, South America, and Asia can be 
attributed to its long-term chief executive officer, Mark Wössner (Anand et al., 2003). 
Wössner became the CEO in 1983, two years after the resignation of Reinhard Mohn, who 
rebuilt the family-owned company after World War II and led it until the age of 60 (Anand et 
al., 2003). When Wössner left his post in 1998 at the age of 60, which has been the 
company’s mandatory retirement age, he was succeeded by Thomas Middelhoff who is 
credited with the beginning of a “phase of drastic changes at the company” (Radhika, 2003, 
p. 5). Middelhoff sought to create a truly global media player through international expansion 
and with the help of anticipated growth opportunities presented by the era of rapid 
development of the Internet and related technologies, or the New Economy.  
In the United States, privately held Bertelsmann captured major headlines in 1998 when it 
acquired the leading U.S. book publisher Random House and merged it with the company’s 
existing U.S.-based book-publishing group Bantam Doubleday Dell (“Bertelsmann Posts,” 
1999) in a deal worth an estimated $1.2 to $1.4 billion (Herrera, 1998; Klee, 1998). The 
acquisition of Random House could be seen as an example of the “spending spree” of large 
German companies (Bonfante, 1998) in buying production capacity in the U.S. market.  
Other examples of big German companies’ cross-border investment in the United States 
are Daimler Benz’s takeover of Chrysler and Deutsche Bank’s takeover of Bankers Trust 
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(“After the deal,” 1999), also in 1998. Appendix A gives an overview illustrating German 
firms’ increased interest in the U.S. market.The data on Germany’s Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) between 1980-2004 show a clear spike in late 1990s, with 1998 being the 
year with one of the biggest amounts of new investments into the United States.  
The acquisition of Random House signaled Bertelsmann’s rise among the global media 
giants, although in terms of revenue, the company also belonged among the largest media 
companies before the deal as shown by the revenue comparisons of the biggest media 
companies in Table 1 on the next page. At the same time, with Bertelsmann’s rise among the 
familiar names in the media industry and the efforts by Thomas Middelhoff to create a 
globally recognized top tier media conglomerate, the whole media industry witnessed a phase 
of consolidation that coincided with the boom years associated with the hopes put onto new 
technologies and a subsequent cooling period. These developments made Bertelsmann a 
familiar name in the global media marketplace also in the sense that it was among those 
expansionist global media companies,Time Warner and Vivendi Universal being two other 
companies among the biggest media conglomerates,that witnessed “executive casualties” 
(Orwall & Peers, 2003). 
The revenues of the leading global media conglomerates, also characterized as 
transnational media corporations or TNMC’s (Gershon, 2006), between 1995-2005 are 
presented in Table 1 for information purposes only based on the companies’ annual reports 
and do not explicitly take into account particular acquisitions, joint ventures, or divestitures 
over the years. For example, the table does not take into account the considerable effect 
mergers and acquisitions such as French Vivendi’s merger with Canadian Seagram in 2000,
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Viacom’s merger with CBS in 2000, or AOL and Time Warner's deal in 2001 to name just a 
few, that can explain the sharp hikes in revenues over the periods shown in the table. 
Table 1. Annual revenues of the TNMC’s 1995-2005 
Revenue (millions of $) Company 1995 1998 2001 2004 20051 
Time Warner 8,067 26,244 33,507 42,089 43,652 
Disney 12,112 22,976 25,269 30,752 31,944 
Vivendi2 1,326 7,032 25,410 28,943 23,087 
Bertelsmann3 14,868 13,838 17,153 22,984 21,105 
Viacom4 8,700 12,096 23,198 22,526 24,126 
News Corp. 8,627 11,625 12,981 20,959 23,859 
General Electric 70,028 100,469 107,558 134.481 149,702 
NBC 3,919 5,269 5,769 12,886 14,089 
Sony 43,326 56,622 56,979 66,912 47,712 
media 7,842 10,837 9,614 8,883 6,888 
Source: Company Reports  
Notes: 1 Disney’s Fiscal Year (FY) ended in September 2005, News Corporation’s FY ended 
in June 2005, and Sony’s FY ended in March 2005. 2 Vivendi’s earnings include the French 
conglomerate’s media and telecommunications holdings only, as presented in annual reports. 
3 Until 2001, Bertelsmann’s FY ended in June. For previous periods, the table includes 
annual revenues of fiscal years 1994/1995 and 1997/1998. Bertelsmann’s revenue did grow 
between 2004 and 2005 5.1%; the decline in the table reflects the euro/US dollar exchange 
rate difference. 4 Viacom’s numbers for 1995 and 1998 show only revenues for pre-CBS 
merger; the 2005 total represents the arithmetic sum of New Viacom’s ($9,610 millions) and 
CBS Corporation's revenues ($14,536 millions). 
 
Thomas Middelhoff’s visionary leadership associated with the new era in the global media 
landscape can be illustrated by his appearance in a German TV commercial in a Star Trek 
uniform where he declared that Bertelsmann “pursue[s] big ideas--no matter where they 
lead” (Dennis, 2002, p. 8). Middelhoff expressed his firm belief in the Internet Era or New 
Economy and kept alive expansion plans even as other New Economy oriented businesses 
and projects were regressing (Hargrave, 2003). Then, surprisingly, the company’s founding 
Mohn family ousted Middelhoff in July 2002, only a few weeks after he signed a new five-
year contract.  Officially, Middelhoff left because of differences between the management 
and the supervisory board regarding Bertelsmann’s future strategy. The new CEO, Gunter 
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Thielen, has restated Bertelsmann’s strategy as focusing on the company’s core businesses 
and seeking growth primarily through organic initiatives, described by the CEO as steady and 
sustainable improvement of the products and services that result in increased earnings and 
returns (Annual Report, 2002). 
A factor contributing to Thomas Middelhoff’s departure as Bertelsmann’s chief executive 
officer was apparently his “gamble on the future of electronic media” (Peers et al., 2002) that 
failed to produce the expected results. Projects in the Internet or in the New Economy that 
eventually failed include an attempt to create an online book-sales environment to compete 
with Amazon (Ewing, 2004) and Bertelsmann’s music arm’s disastrous deal with Napster. 
The company spent $85 million on this project between 2000 and 2002 before Napster went 
bankrupt and another company, Roxio, picked up its remains (Fritz, 2005). Those examples 
support the official version that Middelhoff’s sudden resignation was not so much related to a 
single business failure but had more to do with differences in the company’s strategy 
(Karnitschnig, 2003).  
On the other hand, some analysts have indicated that the main reason Middelhoff was 
ousted was not because of the failure of his Internet strategies, but rather the dominant Mohn 
family’s fear of losing control over the company (Radhika, 2003). Another possible and 
controversial explanation is presented by German authors, Frank Böckelmann and Hersch 
Fischler (2004), who argue that Middelhoff was forced to resign because the company’s 
owners were worried about the potential legal consequences and the loss of reputation after 
some of Middelhoff’s “tricks and transactions” (Böckelmann & Fischler, 2004, p. 45) related 
to Bertelsmann’s role as a shareholder of AOL Europe. 
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The public may never fully discover whether Middelhoff’s departure because of his losing 
the trust of the company’s majority shareholders was a “Bertelsmann legend” (Böckelmann 
& Fischler, 2004, p. 45) or whether his departure had only to do with his failures in the 
business strategy and the departure was not a part of some bigger cover-up. Perhaps neither 
of those is true, or the true reasons can be found in a combination of both. Nevertheless, the 
company’s public image, when it comes to Middelhoff’s departure, shows a shift in strategy, 
even if the decision to return to the “old economy” was made by Middelhoff himself 
(Böckelmann & Fischler, 2004, p. 18).  
The company’s one-time visionary belief in the New Economy is illustrated by statements 
from its top officials that digitalization and interlinking distribution channels create multiple 
new opportunities and challenges for the company and that consumer value can be further 
enhanced by new kinds of digital content (Thielmann et al., 2001). The preferences have 
changed, though, and the new CEO, Gunter Thielen, has, with the approval of Bertelsmann’s 
majority owners from the Mohn family, put the biggest effort into the company’s core 
businesses: television, book and magazine publishing, music, and media services. However, 
the company also repeatedly stated its goal as being a leading media company worldwide and 
in its press release introducing the results for 2005, Bertelsmann described itself as 
commanding “globally leading positions in the major markets [and its] core business is the 
creation of first-class media content” (“Bertelsmann grows revenues,” 2006). 
When analyzing a global media conglomerate’s strategic orientation and positioning, 
media economics authors have often chosen to look at individual companies in comparison 
with other corporations of comparable structure, performance, and strategy. Bertelsmann, the 
subject of this study, has thus been looked at as a company carrying the characteristics of a 
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transnational media conglomerate similar to those of Time Warner, Vivendi Universal, 
Disney, Viacom, Sony, and News Corporation (Albarran & Moellinger, 2002; Chan-Olmsted 
& Albarran, 1998; Kunczik, 1997). Following, is a brief overview of the transnational media 
conglomerates together with background information about those companies’ business lines. 
One company in the group,Sony,has received variable treatment from different authors. 
For some, Sony should not be viewed as part of the top group in the global communications 
marketplace (Albarran & Moellinger, 2002), while for others (Gershon & Kanayama, 2002; 
Kunczik, 1997), Sony can be compared with other transnational media corporations. This is 
mainly because music and film revenues accounted for less than 10% each of the overall 
income for Sony in 2001 (Gershon & Kanayama, 2002), and most of the company’s revenues 
are obtained through their consumer electronics division and the sale of video players and 
games (Albarran & Moellinger, 2002). In fiscal year 2005, Sony’s music and film revenues 
accounted for 14.4% of the overall revenue, as seen in Table 1 above. But, because 
Bertelsmann’s operations in one core business segment (Bertelsmann’s and Sony’s music 
arms entered into a joint venture in 2004 (Smith, 2006)) are inextricably intertwined with 
those of Sony, the Japanese company is considered a part of the leading actors in global 
media for this study and its strategies and actions are briefly addressed.  
In terms of overall revenue, the biggest company with media interests is General Electric 
(GE), but it traditionally has been excluded from the group of top-tier global media 
companies because GE’s holdings have until recently, been limited to NBC and its branded 
cable networks (Albarran & Moellinger, 2002). Since May 2004, however, GE’s prominence 
in the global media marketplace has increased, as NBC and Vivendi Universal Entertainment 
formed through NBC Universal,where GE owns 80% and Vivendi Universal 20% of the 
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shares,a global media company comparable to the other top-tier media conglomerates in size. 
But as NBC Universal’s share of GE’s overall revenues remains below 10%, General Electric 
itself cannot be considered a media conglomerate.  
Albarran and Moellinger (2002) noted in their study on communication industry firms' 
structure, performance and strategy, a study that did not include Sony, that in several areas 
the structure of top media firms is remarkably similar to one another. Those similarities 
include revenue, the number of corporate officers, and market capitalization (with the 
exception of AOL Time Warner shortly after the merger of AOL and Time Warner). 
Additionally, the corporations share similarities in corporate goals and objectives outlined in 
mission statements (Albarran & Moellinger, 2002). 
All the biggest players in the global media landscape operate in a number of 
communication industries, thus they form what is called a diversified corporation (Dimmick 
& McDonald, 2002). However, the extent to which a company has diversified its operations 
and how interrelated those operations are, in turn have influence on the growth potential of a 
company.  
Robert Picard from Jönköping International Business School (2002) has looked at different 
media industries in light of industry life cycles and he saw industries progressing through 
decline, maturation, growth, and introductory periods. Each of those periods marks changes 
in sales, costs per customer, profits, customers, and competitors that are common across 
industries. Picard also located different media industries in periods of life cycles, presented in 
Table 2 as they stood at the beginning of the 21st Century. Following the table is a brief 
description on transnational media conglomerates’ business portfolios, helpful in analyzing 
Bertelsmann’s and its global peers’ future outlook in terms of industry life cycles. 
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Table 2. Location of media industries in periods of industry life cycles 
Period 
Introductory Growth Maturation 
“Streaming” or online video Satellite Television 
Online Media 
Multimedia 
Audio Recordings 
Books 
Magazines 
Motion Pictures 
Newspapers 
Radio 
Recorded Video 
Television 
Cable Television 
Note: Source The economics and financing of media companies (p. 25), by R. G. Picard, 
2002, New York: Fordham University Press. 
 
Of the global conglomerates, Time Warner, for example, offers online services, cable and 
pay television, the film industry, and magazine publishing (“Our family of brands”). Vivendi 
Universal has interests outside media in waste management, energy, and transport; in media 
it operates worldwide in music, interactive entertainment, television, film, and 
telecommunications (Group Profile). The Walt Disney Company is divided into four major 
business segments: film studios; amusement parks and resorts; consumer products; and 
media networks that encompass television and radio properties (Company Overview). Pre-
split Viacom was active in broadcasting and cable television, programming production, radio, 
movies, and publishing (Viacom overview), while the new Viacom focuses on cable network 
businesses and the other part of the company, CBS Corporation, on broadcast networks 
(Separation Overview).  
Bertelsmann has interests in television, book and magazine publishing, the music industry, 
media services, and book clubs (Interim Report 2005). An organizational structure with the 
information about division names, divisional headquarters, business areas and share in 
overall revenues in 2005 is presented in Appendix B.  
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In book publishing, Bertelsmann is the leader in the U.S. market in trade publishing. In 
fact, in the global book publishing industry several top players are non-U.S. 
headquartered.Britain’s Pearson, British-Dutch Reed Elsevier, and Netherlands’s Wolters 
Kluwer are other non-U.S. leading publishers (Thussu, 2000; van Tulleken, 2004). Unlike 
other publishers, however, Bertelsmann stands out as a global actor in terms of having strong 
interests in additional industry sectors and this reduces its vulnerability to the decline cycle 
print media industry faces. Yet, compared to other transnational media conglomerates that 
are multi-divisional and operate in numerous media markets, Bertelsmann is certainly the 
most exposed to the threat of declining profits and profit margins facing the print media.  
Sony’s product portfolio includes consumer electronics, personal gaming devices, motion 
pictures, music, and insurance and banking (About Sony Group). Australian News 
Corporation, finishing this list of the biggest global media conglomerates, has diversified its 
operations into activities in the film industry, television, cable and satellite television, 
magazines, newspapers, and books (News Corp: Corporate Profile). 
In this environment of global media marketplace and the biggest global conglomerates, the 
following chapter describes and analyzes the literature, mainly from the field of media 
management and economics research, but also from the news media, that discusses 
approaches one can use when evaluating the companies’ strategic positioning. The literature 
review also reviews different authors’ opinions about the challenges faced by companies 
operating in the global media environment, as those challenges helped to form this project’s 
research questions. 
  
CHAPTER III 
Literature review 
 
According to Albarran and Moellinger (2002), insight into the activities of the top media 
companies in the global setting can be gained by looking at those companies in terms of 
structure, performance, and strategy. Here one could also add a fourth factor--ownership--as 
Bertelsmann is privately held, unlike other major media conglomerates. Bertelsmann’s 
former CEO, Thomas Middelhoff, did advocate plans to take the company public in 2005, 
but that plan has not been actively pursued since, because the company’s “patriarch,” 
Reinhard Mohn, has been unwilling to yield his majority control of the company (Hymowitz, 
2002). This project specializes mainly in the strategy dimension of the conglomerates, but the 
other dimensions are also covered, when applicable. 
In broad terms, the strategic objectives of the biggest media companies can be divided into 
two: content and distribution (Albarran & Moellinger, 2002). All those global conglomerates, 
plus Sony that was excluded from a study by Albarran and Moellinger, carry several content 
brands, but use different forms for distribution. The differences in distribution can be mainly 
attributed to the diversification of a corporation, as conglomerates with bigger interests in 
cable expectedly distribute their content mainly through that channel and companies strong in 
publishing tend to use applicable distribution channels. 
Sjurts (2005) has constructed a comparative framework representing the strategic 
management style and orientation of the six biggest media conglomerates. She classified the 
 15 
global leaders,excluding Sony,according to four separate categories of competitive strategies, 
as presented in Table 3.  
Table 3. The competition strategies of TNMCs 
Generic strategy Strategic 
behavior 
Strategic 
orientation 
Internationalization 
strategy 
 
Price 
leader-
ship 
Differ-
entia-
tion 
Reac-
tive 
Inno-
vative 
Inter-
nal 
Exter-
nal 
Inter-
natio-
nal 
Multi-
natio-
nal 
Global 
Disney  *  * *    * 
Viacom  *  *  *  *  
Vivendi 
Uni-
versal 
 *  *  *   * 
Time 
Warner  *  *  *   * 
News 
Corp *   *  *  *  
Bertels-
mann  *  *  *  *  
Note: From Strategien in der Medienbranche. Grundlagen und Fallbeispiele (p. 472), by I. 
Sjurts, 2005, Wiesbaden, Germany: Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag Dr Th. Gabler/GWV 
Fachverlage GmbH. 
 
According to Sjurts (2005), when looking at the generic strategy of a global media 
conglomerate, the companies could choose to be either leaders in price and cost or 
differentiate their product portfolio. When analyzing strategic behavior, classification 
between reactive (defensive) or innovative is made based on the resources, competencies, 
and value system of the company. In the strategic orientation category it can be analyzed 
whether a company sees its growth potential in organic growth from inside, or in the external 
growth options presented by acquisitions and by cooperation. The fourth category reflects the 
internationalization strategy of the conglomerates. A company with international strategy 
focuses mainly on its domestic market and the internationalization is done through exporting 
its products. Companies that establish subsidiaries or joint ventures abroad and follow in 
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such ventures' local management strategies, adopt a multinational strategy. A company with 
a global strategy follows a homogenous and culture-neutral strategy throughout its 
organization. 
Sjurts (2005) notes that the table shows relative uniformity when it comes to the strategic 
choices of global media conglomerates: apart from News Corporation and Disney, the 
dominant combination includes differentiation, innovative behavior, and external growth. 
Sjurts adds that when it comes to cooperation between global conglomerates, an increasingly 
popular choice recently, the diversification of operating areas has led to complex 
relationships between the companies where partners in one setting are direct competitors in 
another.  
While the above represents the relative consensus on how the media companies’ strategies 
should be analyzed and what the picture looks like in the top tier of the global media 
marketplace, the particular strategic decisions and choices during the recent years have not 
produced a great number of published studies. One explanation for this may be that several of 
the media giants are still trying to find winning strategies to guide them through the current 
period of uncertainty and relevant market challenges. Those challenges forcing the modern 
media corporations to seek new strategies are illustrated by Wall Street Journal'  journalist, 
Matthew Karnitschnig’s notion that “[t]he Internet … is forcing the major media companies 
to rethink how they sell their content” (Karnitschnig, 2006a, p. B1). In addition, Western 
Michigan University professor, Richard Gershon, points at two emerging trends to look at, 
when studying transnational media management: 
    The first trend is the growing importance of the second tier [Transnational Media 
Corporations] that now provides an abundance of the world’s media information and 
entertainment product. /…/ The second important trend is the demassification of media 
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and entertainment product made possible by the Internet and advanced recording and 
storage technologies.” (Gershon, 2006, pp. 224-5). 
 
Relying on Karnitschnig’s remark about the challenges posed by the Internet to media 
companies, Bertelsmann’s new strategic orientation and positioning should be analyzed in 
light of the former chairman, Thomas Middelhoff’s, strong expectations related to the 
potential of the New Economy. Middelhoff wanted to transform the company into a leading 
global player “at the front of the Internet revolution” (Radhika, 2003, p. 5), a revolution that 
produced one of the biggest media conglomerates--AOL Time Warner--at the height of the 
New Economy boom through the merger of America Online and Time Warner in 2001.  
This “Internet revolution” failed to materialize in solid financial performance in several 
cases and brought with it instead, reshuffles in the companies’ top management, which have 
caused questions such as the one posed by Orwall and Peers (2003) about whether 
conglomerates in the entertainment industry make sense at all and what is the right economic 
strategy for media. Gershon (2006) notes on similar lines, that the companies may feel at 
times of increased competition that increased size makes for a better company, while it is not 
always the case.  
It is not difficult to find other recent examples among the global media conglomerates that 
illustrate the need to study strategic positioning of top players in light of thoughts expressed 
by Orwall and Peers and Gershon. In the top group, failures in strategic leadership or 
management missteps have occurred, for example, in the merged AOL Time Warner venture, 
renamed as Time Warner in 2003 (“AOL Time Warner to Rename,” 2003), and in Vivendi 
Universal (“Strategic leadership failures,” 2004).  
Gerald Levin and Steve Case, top managers behind the AOL and Time Warner merger, by 
Gershon’s (2006) account “one of the worst mergers in U.S. corporate history” (p. 218), 
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resigned within three years after the merger was announced (Albarran & Gormly, 2004). 
Vivendi Universal’s CEO, Jean Marie Messier, dreaming of building a Franco-American 
media giant (Carreyrou & Smith, 2005), was forced to resign 1.5 years after Vivendi merged 
with Canadian Seagram in 2001 (Albarran & Gormly, 2004). And Bertelsmann’s Thomas 
Middelhoff, having pursued aggressive expansion in the United States (Karnitschnig, 2005), 
left Bertelsmann’s top post after what some authors have called strategic blunders in New 
Media (Ewing, 2004). 
The degree of uncertainty in the media industry is further shown by the recent 
developments such as the split of Viacom into two companies at the beginning of 2006 in 
order to “adapt to a changing competitive environment” (Separation Overview). This drives 
one even further to pose questions about the viability of the “conglomerate model” in the 
media industry. Viacom made one of the biggest media industry mergers in 2000, when it 
reunited with CBS in a $45 billion merger after a split forced by the government 30 years ago 
(CBS Corporation: History), and the company has since clearly attracted attention as one 
among the biggest in the global media industry. Viacom’s split in the beginning of 2006 will 
surely change the rankings based on revenues of the single companies, albeit the owner of the 
controlling stake in the “old” Viacom and the chairman of the company, Sumner Redstone, 
continues to hold a controlling stake in the two new companies (Flint, 2006).  
A similar quest for success formulas is present in the uncertainty surrounding Time 
Warner’s future (Karnitschnig, 2006b), where only in February 2006 did the dissatisfied 
shareholder, Carl Icahn, and Time Warner reach an agreement in a dispute over Icahn’s 
attempt to break up the company (“Icahn and Time Warner,” 2006). Plus, in the closing 
stages of this project the news media published reports that Bertelsmann may be on the verge 
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of exiting from the music business in order to avoid taking the company public in 2006 
(Bertelsmann, 2006; “Bertelsmann sale of,” 2006). 
Such uncertainty surrounding the strategies of global media companies together with 
limited analysis available about current strategic orientation and positioning provide 
sufficient rationale for analyzing chosen management techniques and strategies that influence 
Bertelsmann’s performance in the global media market. While analyzing one company’s 
action in this marketplace, it must be remembered that the transnational media corporations, 
including the leading companies, are not monolithic in their approach to business, as they 
tend to operate in preferred markets instead of all markets in the world (Gershon, 2006). But 
as the conglomerates’, including Bertelsmann’s, strategic management, organizational 
structure and mere size following industry-wide consolidation have given basis to many 
different studies focusing on the global media industry and its biggest players (i.e., Albarran 
& Moellinger, 2002; Gershon, 1997, Sjurts, 2005), a study analyzing the implications of one 
actor’s strategy changes to the overall picture is contributing to the field of media economics. 
Plus, the findings of such a study can be seen as an attempt to lay the groundwork for a wider 
theoretical construction helping to analyze global media companies in the current 
environment. 
When analyzing a company’s future outlook and speculating about the outcome, it is 
important to look for key factors that influence the whole market or operating environment. 
At the same time, the analyzed company’s unique characteristics must be placed into this 
setting. Therefore, when analyzing Bertelsmann’s current management and future prospects, 
it is important to remember that Bertelsmann is unique compared to its global peers when it 
comes to ownership. While private ownership is not entirely unusual among the top 10 or 
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even top 20 media companies, at least in the biggest single market, the United States, 
privately held media firms are still outnumbered by publicly held companies by 17 to 3 
(Jung, 2003). This fact makes it hard to compare and analyze Bertelsmann’s and its 
competitors’ basic financial performance indicators, such as earning per share, return on 
equity, and return on assets. On the other hand, while enjoying the “luxury of family 
ownership” (“My way or the highway,” 2006), Bertelsmann has prepared itself for the capital 
markets (“Thielen: wir sind vorbereitet,” 2006) and thus its actions in the global market 
could be viewed in similar terms to its peers.  
Although Bertelsmann is technically prepared for going public (“Thielen: wir sind 
vorbereitet,” 2006), the minority shareholder, Groupe Bruxelles Lambert’s (GBL) request 
may not result in a public offering of Bertelsmann’s shares, because the 25.1% share of GBL 
could also be acquired by some other minority shareholder or by the controlling Mohn family 
(Bertelsmann, 2006; “Mediengigant mit DAX-Ambitionen,” 2006). The company’s 
announced preparedness for going public, while remaining reluctant to do so, may be one of 
the factors helping to explain some of the strategic management choices and long term goals 
of Bertelsmann that the latest reports show, yet are not officially commented on by the 
company, about Bertelsmann’s willingness to sell the music arm in order to prevent going 
public. 
Privately held Bertelsmann has, similar to its competitors and industry peers, put a heavy 
emphasis on performance in the U.S. market. The U.S. market was seen by the company 
during its biggest merger and acquisition activity so far, the acquisition of book publisher 
Random House, as a new market helping to drive growth (Wolf, 2002). However, the share 
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of the United States in the total revenues of Bertelsmann has fallen from 32.2% in fiscal year 
2000/2001 to 20.5% in fiscal year 2005 (Annual Report, 2000/2001; Annual Report 2005). 
Since Gunter Thielen took the top seat in this company headquartered in Gütersloh, a small 
town in Germany, Bertelsmann has pursued a conservative business model by returning to 
strategies utilized prior to Middelhoff’s era that was marked with high profile expansion 
plans and attempts to increase competitiveness by centralizing a historically decentralized 
corporation. While the departure of Middelhoff has not brought about a return  to searching 
for opportunities for cross-unit synergies, the company has re-emphasized the value it puts on 
the culture of decentralization in labor division and decision-making (Schulze et al., 2005). 
During the last few years, the company has also sold its academic and professional book 
publishing division, Bertelsmann Springer, disposed of its U.S. magazines business (Annual 
Report 2003, 2004), and basically discontinued the e-commerce projects initiated by Thomas 
Middelhoff. At the time, those projects were viewed by this “media industry Wunderkind” 
(Peers et al., 2003) as tools helping Bertelsmann to become a global powerhouse with online 
distribution of books and music (Annual Report 2000/01). 
Such developments lead a researcher interested in international communication and global 
media economics to ask what the future holds for Bertelsmann and what lessons may this 
approach entail for other media companies. Böckelmann and Fischler (2004), for example, 
characterize Bertelsmann transforming from a company that, in the second half of 20th 
Century put all effort into growth initiatives, into a company putting the brake on growth. For 
those authors, this means that Bertelsmann faces the challenges and stormy developments in 
global markets without clear objectives. On the other hand, it is not difficult to see chairman 
Gunter Thielen’s logic behind the statement about the days of great leaps and blockbuster 
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deals being over for at least the time being. Many giant companies in several industries, not 
only in the media, that emerged from “blockbuster” merger and acquisition deals have failed 
to produce expected synergies or achieve “efficiency enhancement” goals (Du Boff & 
Herman, 2001).  
Mark Sirower, an merger and acquisitions professor at NYU's, Stern School of Business, 
argued before the media industry mega mergers starting in the late 1990s that about a third of 
companies create value in acquisitions and about 70% tend to fail (Sirower, 1997). Mergers 
and acquisitions in media industry are no exception in this regard. Analyzing merger and 
acquisition failures in media industries, Peltier (2004) notes that despite expected greater 
economic efficiency, especially through size effects, the hopes placed on those deals are 
often disappointing. Even before the burst of the “dotcom bubble,” Kunczik (1997) argued 
that in light of the enormous investments into the media and communications industry, 
audiences may not be ready to spend enough for those investments to pay off. Thus, this 
global race between and among the existing media giants can be looked at also as a period 
not meeting the growth expectations, when the consumers couldn’t pay for the investments 
and the expansionist strategies did not live up to the expectations. This, in turn, may have led 
Bertelsmann to its established core competencies that promise profitability, albeit with lower 
margins and in industry sectors subject to threats of decline.  
To study Bertelsmann’s future outlook in terms of its strategic positioning is also 
interesting in light of its continued careful approach to new acquisitions. With the help of 
industry experts, it can be analyzed whether future success for Bertelsmann is seen indeed in 
strategic initiatives such as Bertelsmann’s and Sony’s joint venture in the music business, a 
joint venture that can be dissolved in 2009 (Smith, 2006) and very recently has become the 
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subject of reports about Bertelsmann’s exit from the music business.  Examples of outward-
looking growth include a deal in 2005 to acquire DVD retailer Columbia House in the United 
States (Interim Report January-June 2005) and the company may expand into television and 
printing markets, its core businesses, in the Middle East (“Bertelsmann in talks,” 2005). 
Additionally, Bertelsmann’s participation in the European “Google-killer” initiative, an 
ongoing Franco-German project aiming to challenge the Internet search engine Google 
(“Quaero’s challenge,” 2006), serves as an example of the company’s continued belief into 
the Internet and its importance for a media company.  
Despite those examples of continued outward growth initiatives, the company has 
promised to allocate around three billion dollars for renewed expansion activities (Riering, 
2005), Bertelsmann in general, seems to have taken a very risk averse approach to outward 
growth in recent years. This has led Böckelmann and Fischler (2004), whose book on 
Bertelsmann is a highly critical work on the subject, to suggest that a “world class media 
conglomerate who wishes to expand … and at the same time follows the principle of not 
making any mistakes, is an antithesis in itself” (p. 291). 
Nowhere are the challenges in the current marketplace more vivid than in Bertelsmann’s 
experience in a joint venture with Sony’s music arm, that was established in 2004. 
Bertelsmann CEO Gunter Thielen acknowledged that merging the different philosophies of 
BMG and Sony creates difficulties (“Bertelsmann räumt Probleme ein,” 2005), when 
Bertelsmann and Sony held talks about not extending Sony BMG’s CEO Andrew Lack’s 
contract set to expire in 2006 (“Führungskrise bei Sony BMG,” 2005). And while the four-
month battle between the two global conglomerates was settled in February 2006, it may yet 
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take a lot of effort to “[mend] divisions that have beset the company at nearly all levels” 
(Smith, 2006, p. A4). 
Thus it can be argued that this global media conglomerate has adopted an apparently 
conservative approach after some costly ventures at the turn of the century, and that the 
strategy is based on building corporate culture on partnership, decentralization, and 
entrepreneurship (Annual Report 2003). At the same time, the company wishes to be a 
leading media company in all markets it operates (Böckelmann & Fischler, 2004), and it 
carries only conditional competitive advantages when it comes to the global media industry 
because its content production relies heavily on television businesses in fragmented 
European markets and in print media (Sjurts, 2005).  
This has led Böckelmann and Fischler (2004) to question whether the company has a 
future “global market vision” (p. 255) and “any idea at all, what to do in the mass media 
industry” (p. 292). On the other hand, Lehning (2004) suggests that Bertelsmann has gained 
such a strong position in the market that it will either control the markets with few 
competitors or even conquer a dominant position. Lehning goes even as far as using a term 
Bertelsmannization for the strategies other conglomerates may choose to follow.  
The developments in the global media marketplace that have led media conglomerates, 
Bertelsmann among them, to seek strategies for success, the limited nature of recent 
comprehensive analysis on identifying such strategies and their outlook, and conflicting 
suggestions by authors about the implications of changes implemented by Bertelsmann since 
2002, led to the research questions about the company and its future as presented next. 
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Research questions 
 
Robert G. Picard, the author of several works on media management and director of Media 
Management and Transformation Centre at Jönköping International Business School, has 
noted that media managers have been forced to adopt new techniques to operate in changing 
environments and markets (Picard, 2004). This is necessary because media managers have 
been ill prepared to counteract past turbulence in the market (“Media companies,” 2003), and 
they are still struggling to find the strategies that work. 
The current uncertainty faced by many media companies, different strategies sought to face 
those challenges and ensure future success were the basis for developing the two research 
questions addressed in this study. The research questions attempting to position Bertelsmann 
in the global media marketplace and wishing to analyze the success outlook of those 
strategies are following: 
RQ1: Do Bertelsmann’s actions and strategic statements indicate the corporation’s 
continued interest in maintaining its position among the leading media 
corporations? 
RQ2: How do media industry experts evaluate the success potential of such a new 
strategic approach in a global environment, where other large players may have 
chosen a different and less risk averse path? 
As management consulting firm McKinsey & Company consultants have noted, it is 
unlikely that market expectations in the media and entertainment industry can be met merely 
by organic initiatives (Ferrari et al., 2003), and large corporations face tough decisions in 
meeting growth expectations and keeping a competitive advantage (Smit et al., 2005). Such 
expectations are countered by pessimistic looks at growth through acquisition or 
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convergence. These counter-statements do not rule out the effect of convergence on success 
altogether, but they caution not to look at acquisitions and/or mergers as the “big idea“ that 
helps companies achieve success by itself (Dennis, 2002; Gershon, 2006). Similarly, looking 
at one global conglomerate and evaluating its future outlook may be helpful in analyzing, 
what strategies current media giants are adopting to face the challenges posed by the “time of 
great upheaval in the media industry” (Karnitschnig, 2006a, p. B.1) and how an established 
media conglomerate faces threats from New Media companies that may “shunt old ones 
aside as producers of content” (“King content,” 2006).  
Some of the available analysis on management strategies of global media conglomerates is 
focused on public companies, because it is no doubt easier to evaluate their performance and 
compare their financial data with those of their publicly traded peers. But Bertelsmann 
competes with the publicly held conglomerates in the same markets and it has not completely 
abandoned the idea of going public (Becker, 2005; “Thielen: Wir sind vorbereitet,” 2006), 
therefore, findings from a study on Bertelsmann can be helpful in analyzing other media 
conglomerates and their strategic orientation.  
Time constraints, the changing nature of the global media industry, and the recentness of 
many of the strategic choices addressed would undermine any comprehensive conclusions 
about the success of an adopted new strategy or strategies. Also, this study carries within it 
the problems of temporal validity as media organizations evolve constantly (Doyle & Frith, 
2006). On the other hand, the study can be looked at as an attempt to evaluate whether the 
steps taken by Bertelsmann as one of the major media conglomerates can be seen as bringing 
success in light of what some other conglomerates are currently undertaking. And the 
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findings and conclusions of this study can be used as a benchmark for further studies on the 
subject. 
Methods and theoretical framework 
  
The two research questions outlined above can be answered by employing different 
methods or methodological approaches. In the form they are stated, they direct a researcher 
to utilize methods available for conducting a case study, a research tool commonly used in 
media management and economics research (Doyle & Frith, 2006). The method chosen was 
built around in-depth interviews with sources mainly in the field of academia but also from 
the company itself and in the news media. 
The problem with in-depth interviews and the decision to choose a case study approach is 
the accessibility to relevant data that can be provided by industry insiders. In fact, the 
response from company insiders contacted for the purpose of this study was almost 
nonexistent; access was secured to only one corporate executive in the company, while the 
requests for interviewing Bertelsmann AG’s former chairman, Thomas Middelhoff and 
current chairman, Gunter Thielen were turned down or not answered. Therefore, I 
approached outside researchers and experts in the field of academia and journalism who had 
produced works or given comments on the subject of global media economics. This research 
is thus not a traditional case study with the informants being mainly the company insiders, 
but rather a constructed study, where the case is built relying on outside experts’ perceptions 
of a company’s inner workings.  
Böckelmann and Fischler (2004) proved in their critical study on Bertelsmann that it is 
possible to produce a substantial work with the help of outside experts and without direct 
input from the corporate “façade” (p. 12). Thus, this study should not be rejected on the basis 
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of the mere fact that it looks at the company mainly through the eyes of outside observers, 
but rather the results should be viewed as mainly consolidating external observers’ opinions.  
Participant recruiting and interview process 
 
This qualitative research was conducted with the help of a small number of in-depth 
interviews, and the data consist of interview transcriptions and additional information 
obtained through follow-up contacts with the participants. I identified potential interviewees 
based on background academic literature and articles in the news media. Since this 
qualitative research studied a particular phenomenon in the setting of the global media 
industry, the sampling of interviewees was purposeful, a combination of variation and 
snowball sampling (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002).  
The number of potential participants, media economics scholars, Bertelsmann AG 
executives, journalists, stock market analysts, and management consultants, able to discuss 
this subject was relatively small and geographically very dispersed. This, together with the 
lack of external funding for in-person interviews conducted in various states in the United 
States or countries in Europe, directed me to use 30-60 minute phone interviews for data 
collection. The interviews were conducted according to the loose script presented in 
Appendix C. One interviewee asked the researcher to conduct the interview in written format 
and, given the difficulties of recruiting more than only a moderate number of participants, 
that participant’s wish was met by the researcher. While using a different method could have 
influenced the data collection considerably, because the researcher and the interviewee 
lacked the benefits offered by a personal phone-call, such as developing a follow-up question 
or discussion on some of the responses, all input by industry experts is nevertheless useful. 
Additionally, as the written questionnaire was based on the phone interview script, the data 
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collected with the alternative method were integrated with the data gathered from other 
interviews. 
I sent requests for interviews to 28 people either directly or through organizations these 
people are affiliated with. A total of eight phone interviews were conducted and one 
interview was done in written format. While limited in overall number, the sample of eight 
phone interviews and one written interview is suitable for a thesis project bearing the 
characteristics of a case study, as every participant is a renowned expert in the field and has 
been referred to or have themselves written in scholarly literature and in the news media in 
relationship to the topic under study. Additionally, acting as an indicative proof of the limited 
“pool” of potential scholars, is Böckelmann and Fischler’s (2004) substantial study on 
Bertelsmann. The two authors co-operated for their book with around 70 experts from 
various fields that included the company itself, various journalists, publishers, agents.  
Of the nine interviewees, four were media economics and media management academics 
currently working with U.S. academic institutions: Alan Albarran, Professor and Chair in the 
Department of Radio, Television and Film at the University of North Texas; Everette Dennis, 
Professor in the Fordham University Graduate School of Business Administration; Richard 
Gershon, Professor in the School of Communication at Western Michigan University; and 
Ann Hollifield, an Associate Professor in the Grady College of Journalism and Mass 
Communication at the University of Georgia. 
Three interviewees were scholars currently affiliated with European academic institutions: 
Marian Keynes, Professor with an European university;* Robert Picard, Professor and 
Director of the Media Management and Transformation Centre in Jönköping Business 
School at Jönköping University, Sweden; and Bozena Mierzejewska, a doctorate student at 
                                                
* This interviewee is identified with a pseudonym and the institutional affiliation is given at a general level. 
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the Media and Communications Management Institute at the University of St. Gallen, 
Switzerland.  
In addition to the scholars in the field of media economics, the group of interviewees also 
included one journalist and one Bertelsmann employee. Matthew Karnitschnig is a journalist 
with Wall Street Journal writing about the media industry and he worked in Germany until 
the beginning of 2006 covering news about corporate Germany, including the media. The 
ninth interviewee was Stephan Sieprath, vice president of Bertelsmann’s Corporate Network 
business unit. 
All interviews, including the interviews with two participants whose native language was 
not English, were conducted in English. I attempted to obtain the participants’ views to 
address the research questions and analyze whether Bertelsmann is perceived as wishing to 
maintain its status in the global industry among the top players and how its future outlook is 
seen in this setting through semi-structured interviews, identified as a suitable tool for such 
research by Hollifield and Coffey (2006). In the course of discussions I sought participants’ 
answers to the question whether Bertelsmann can be seen as being interested in remaining 
among the biggest and the most influential media corporations in the world by using its extra 
careful approach to further expansion through acquisitions, or must the company still be open 
to bold moves in any given market, as suggested by some background literature (Smit et al., 
2005).   
Researcher as the research instrument 
 
The influence that my personal background may have had on the data gathering and 
analyzing process was most likely related to my background as a European graduate student 
conducting a study on a European media conglomerate. Constructing the research questions, 
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interview questionnaire, and interpreting emerging categories that describe this media 
conglomerate’s global positioning may all have been connected to my closeness to European, 
and especially German, culture in general and business culture in particular. Therefore I had 
to be careful not to let my European background subjectively influence interpreting the data. 
On the other hand, my background as an international student with certain knowledge of 
cultural norms and conditions in Europe may have acted as a benefit to this study by 
directing me to ask some questions and interpreting the answers in a way that scholars from 
the United States may not always be able to do, due to their different cultural background. 
On the other hand, the study may also reflect my reliance on U.S. scholarly literature. 
Although a considerable amount of media economics research is done outside the United 
States, and that trend is upward moving, a notable portion of the background literature used 
for the design of the study was U.S.-based and thus may reflect the value systems and 
cultural norms prevalent in U.S. media economics research.  
On assessing the reaction to me as a researcher on the part of potential participants, two 
major issues can be pointed out. First, the reaction by potential sources affiliated with or 
close to the company may have been generally rejecting, given the company’s non-public 
status and the low profile, a Master’s thesis, of the study. Secondly, the reaction from the 
scholars contacted on the subject can be generally viewed as appreciating, given the still 
relative novelty of media economics research in general and research on this global player in 
particular. 
In addition to the reaction my requests for interviews may have prompted, it is likely that 
the actual interviews themselves may have raised some questions related to the level of my 
academic and linguistic abilities. The participants, to whom English is the first language, may 
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have had some concerns regarding my language proficiency. Similarly, some participants, 
with English being their second or third language, may have had concerns both about my 
ability as well as their own ability to convey all ideas or thoughts clearly.  
It is reasonable to suggest, however, that the international nature of media economics 
research played down those concerns. Some support to this suggestion can be found from my 
success in recruiting through snowball sampling, as I recruited three people through snowball 
sampling and every participant was clearly willing to help me beyond her or his personal 
comments and thoughts, suggesting additional sources who could be of help. 
Data analysis  
 
While transcribing the interviews by myself no doubt would have had advantages, such as 
knowing the participants and the context, picking up certain themes or issues, and thus 
listening to the interview in a more studied way (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002), due to time 
constraints, all interviews were transcribed by a professional transcription service. To 
minimize the effect a person unfamiliar with the subject transcribing the interviews, I listened 
to all of the interviews and compared them to their transcription at least once before the data 
analysis.  
Since the subject of this research was to study a phenomenon, a company in a setting of the 
global media industry, the analysis was based on smooth verbatim transcript of the 
interviews. While the line between editing for clarity and editing that somewhat damages the 
original social situation (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002) may be unclear, it is reasonable to suggest 
that smooth verbatim transcript conveyed the meaning of the text on the subject under study. 
I coded the interviews according to guidelines by Lindlof and Taylor (2002) and Strauss 
and Corbin (1998). In the open coding stage the analysis was aimed at identifying key 
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concepts from the interview transcripts, concepts helpful in identifying all possible categories 
explaining the subject under study. While in this stage of analysis I was looking at all 
possible categories emerging from the data, it was also in this stage when the initial 
subcategories were identified. In this stage a total of 58 categories emerged from the 
interview transcripts.  
After the open coding process, I examined the data with an attempt to integrate the 
categories where possible, and looked at the categories in a way that offered either new 
categories or seemed to suggest a theme that reached across several categories. It was also in 
this stage where I consolidated the category list, because the initial coding process produced 
several interviewee-specific categories that related to slightly different initial categories 
emerging from other transcripts. Eventually, the open coding process produced 21 categories 
and these categories, together with excerpts from interviews illustrating the categories, are 
listed in Appendix D. 
Following the open coding and initial axial coding processes that helped to identify the 
instances in the transcripts forming the categories, I looked at the categories with the intent to 
look for connections between categories that suggested a central concept describing the 
connections of all single concepts illustrated by the categories. During the analysis process, I 
also looked for possible negative cases emerging from the data. Where applicable, such 
negative cases that suggested alternative interpretation to the dominant theme of a concept or 
a phenomenon are also presented in the results section. 
The analysis did not reach the stage of theoretical saturation in a way that no new 
properties or dimensions emerged from the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). At the same time, 
the interviews reached the point of data saturation in terms that no new information or 
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themes were identified in the data. The data analysis also left few questions or gaps in the 
categories, such as evaluating the importance and prominence of those categories as seen by 
the interviewees. But given the limited time available for a thesis project, it was not feasible 
to pursue theoretical sampling strategy or recruit new participants to sufficiently develop the 
category in terms of properties and dimensions (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) in all cases.  
Acknowledging those limitations that should be addressed in further research, the 
discussions with participants produced several categories suggesting initial answers to the 
two research questions. The results from the interviews and the categories that emerged from 
eight discussions over the phone and one written interview are presented in next chapter.
  
CHAPTER IV  
Results 
 
Based on the discussions with the participants, I constructed a general framework with a 
set of concepts aiming to answer the research question that inquired about the visible 
evidence of Bertelsmann’s continued interest in being a top-tier transnational media 
conglomerate and the research question that aimed to evaluate the future prospects of 
Bertelsmann as a transnational media conglomerate. The individual categories building this 
framework are presented in Appendix D. A full description of the results divide this chapter 
into two main parts, each addressing one of the research questions of this study. 
The first research question attempted to find out whether Bertelsmann’s actions and 
statements indicate an interest in keeping its status among the top-tier media corporations. 
The data suggest this question can be answered by summarizing the concepts emerging from 
the interviewees’ views on the global media environment and how Bertelsmann’s 
performance and strategic orientation look in this setting presented in the first part of the 
results chapter.  
I will address the second research question about the interviewees’ views on the outlook of 
Bertelsmann succeeding in the current global environment in the next part of this chapter. 
Because I looked at Bertelsmann throughout this study in comparison with its peers in the top 
tier of global media conglomerates, this part of the framework also presents the interviewees’ 
views on the current challenges faced by all conglomerates in the media industries in addition 
to the challenges faced by Bertelsmann.   
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With every category and the description of results, it must be remembered that although 
the respondents’ views showed considerable consensus in certain aspects and dichotomous 
opinions in others, this was a qualitative study with only nine participants. Therefore, all 
statements about the similarities or differences between opinions represent only the views of 
the participants and they should not be seen as presenting views that can be generalized to a 
larger population, such as most or the majority of academics or experts.  
Category I. Bertelsmann’s current strategic management 
  
To build a comprehensive picture about Bertelsmann’s current strategic management and 
actions as understood by outside observers, as were eight of the nine interviewees, the first 
main category produced a setting where Bertelsmann is placed among its global peers and 
other actors in the global media marketplace. The excerpts illustrating the subcategories in 
this section describe how the respondents saw Bertelsmann among its global competitors and 
how they evaluated the company’s actions in this environment. In detail, this main category 
consists of four subcategories that emerged from the discussions and are presented below. 
Category I.I. Complexity of the media marketplace 
 
A dominant theme emerging from many of the interviews is the level of complexity of 
global media marketplace, and the fact that this complexity is often overlooked. It may be 
argued that it is not very relevant in regard to this study that is looking only at a very small 
piece of the overall picture. However, the interviewees’ frequent reference to the various 
layers of the global media marketplace must be summarized, because this subcategory helps 
to understand their positioning of Bertelsmann AG in the global environment and evaluation 
of its strategic orientation. 
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Five of the nine interviewees stressed the importance of looking beyond the commonly 
listed top media conglomerates when analyzing the global media and communications 
environment. At the same time, the interviewees, some of whom are authors of the works 
referred to in the literature review, were rather unanimous when classifying the top-tier 
companies in the overall picture.  
For the University of Georgia's Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication 
Associate Professor, Ann Hollifield, the global media marketplace: 
is much more complex than is usually acknowledged in discussions of it. Both research 
and media discussions of the global media marketplace tend to focus on the major 
players in the marketplace, what [Anthony] Smith called the “global behemoth.”  … The 
really major players such as Sony, AOL Time Warner or Time Warner now, 
Bertelsmann, Viacom--[there are] five or six really major companies…. But, in fact, the 
global media marketplace is a lot more complex than that. There’s a whole second tier of 
companies that have major investments overseas. 
 
On similar lines, Professor Keynes emphasized the complicated nature of the global media 
landscape and the difficulties faced when trying to develop theories about global media: 
    I think [the global media landscape] is a very diffused and varied field. I think it’s 
very difficult to come up with universal characteristics to be honest. I mean, stratified in 
different ways obviously by the various sectors of the media industry by the sizes of the 
players within their sectors. And then obviously we have the kind of conglomerates as 
well, who are sort of a meta-group in a way, actually within various segments, but also 
kind of a group of their own. I think one of the problems actually in developing any kind 
of intelligent theory for media industry is actually the diversity there. 
 
When asked to position Bertelsmann in this setting based on the company’s past and 
current performance, not surprisingly, all participants looked at Bertelsmann in comparative 
terms with the other biggest media conglomerates. As with the available literature, the 
interviewees’ listing of the biggest media conglomerates varied slightly, but none of the 
companies listed as the global players was outside the group of seven biggest companies 
identified in the background chapter. The following excerpts from the interviews serve as 
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examples of which companies the respondents saw as the most important global media 
conglomerates. 
Bozena Mierzejewska: For me, biggest media players, what I see them as global media 
players, will be Time Warner merged with AOL…. The other will be Bertelsmann, that 
is also a very important global player and at the same time very important global player 
in Europe. And the third from my point of view, very important global media player, 
will be … Rupert Murdoch’s company … News Corporation. 
 
Matthew Karnitschnig: You have the top five [major players in global media. Time] 
Warner is biggest, and then Viacom, which recently split into two companies, in what 
they call the New Viacom … and then you have the other half of the old Viacom…. It’s 
owned by the same person, controlled by the same person…. And then you have News 
Corp, which is similar to Bertelsmann in that it’s very international. That’s the one 
owned by Rupert Murdoch…. And then you have Bertelsmann obviously, which is 
focused mostly on old-line media assets….Disney, of course. 
 
Alan Albarran: Pretty much the global landscape is dominated by seven companies. It’s 
a global oligopoly that exists and the … companies have come from three different 
regions of the world. And the U.S. is Viacom and Disney, Time Warner, and, most 
recently, News Corporation, which … [has] moved their base of headquarters to New 
York. And then you have Bertelsmann … in Germany, which is really the lone European 
representative. We have Sony out of Japan, which is another one…. [The seventh 
company is] NBC Universal. We traditionally had had two players out of Europe, the 
other one being Vivendi. But then when of course they had their troubles and went into 
decline and essentially sold off the bulk of their media assets to GE’s NBC division, then 
that really ratcheted up that company or that part of the GE empire to become more of a 
global player. 
 
The views of those three interviewees were similar to the answers the other six persons 
gave to the question about the top tier or major media conglomerates. In light of the uniform 
view of Bertelsmann in the global media marketplace as one of the major players, the 
interviewees with almost similar consensus stressed the unique nature of Bertelsmann. This 
uniqueness formed the second subcategory that is presented next. 
Category I.II. Bertelsmann is unique 
 
While Bertelsmann is among one of the “usual suspects,” as the top-tier companies were 
categorized by one of the participants, Bertelsmann and its management bear unique 
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characteristics that help to explain the company’s strategic orientation and development. Not 
surprisingly, Stephan Sieprath, the only company insider among the interviewees, made the 
strongest statements indicating the company’s uniqueness and its benefits. While other 
participants also supported Sieprath’s views about Bertelsmann being significantly different 
from the other conglomerates, not all the interviewees agreed with Sieprath about the benefits 
of those unique features. 
The unique nature of Bertelsmann, compared to the other large media conglomerates, was 
illustrated by its private ownership, German background, and the historical evolution of the 
company. Two examples of the reasons why the interviewees saw Bertelsmann as being 
unique among the global media conglomerates, are presented below: 
Ann Hollifield: Bertelsmann … is a fairly unique company in that pantheon of true 
global behemoths for several different reasons. First, of course, it is the only essentially 
private company in the group…. It is also unique in that … its core business was very 
different from the core businesses that provided the foundations for the other global 
behemoths…. And the company is quintessentially German. 
 
Matthew Karnitschnig: There’s a term in German--Bodenständig--which means sort of 
down to earth, which is actually what that company is, it feels very down to earth.… 
[Bertelsmann] has a very conservative approach to debt, so what that has meant is that 
they have sort of limited themselves to businesses that are not really high growth, like 
books and magazines. 
 
Although the overall perception of Bertelsmann’s unique nature, illustrated by the above 
excerpts, was representative of the interviewees’ opinions, not every interviewee agreed that  
private ownership is an exclusive feature found only in Bertelsmann. Professors Keynes and 
Gershon noted when addressing Bertelsmann’s private ownership, that the company is not 
that much different from some of its global peers because there are also similar controlling 
family related influences on publicly traded News Corporation and Viacom, given the strong 
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influence that Rupert Murdoch and Sumner Redstone have on the operations of those 
companies respectively. 
Another difference between Bertelsmann and the rest of the “global behemoths,” to use 
Ann Hollifield’s classification, is the decentralized management structure of Bertelsmann. 
Not surprisingly, again, the person referring to this particular characteristic and its benefits 
over being a highly centralized company was Stephan Sieprath from Bertelsmann. Sieprath’s 
view, presented below, that their decentralized nature distinguishes Bertelsmann from the 
other global companies was also in line with opinions expressed by other interviewees, as 
illustrated by an excerpt from the interview with Richard Gershon: 
Stephan Sieprath: We are indeed a very decentralized company, we probably have 600 
different business units and they are run by a managing director each, and these 
managing directors, they really believe that, well, they actually regard the company that 
they’re running as their own company…. Decisions are made very quickly and that is … 
very helpful, and that’s also compared to Time Warner or to other major companies that 
also have very good strategies. 
 
Richard Gershon: The thing that has always been remarkable thing about Bertelsmann is 
that it has been so decentralized…. Here you have this company, whose headquarters is 
in a town called Gütersloh, Germany, and … my understanding is that it’s not a very big 
town, and yet it manages this huge facility and that all of its external operations are far 
bigger than the central headquarters. 
 
These three main characteristics, a German background, private ownership, and 
decentralized nature, making Bertelsmann unique among the top media conglomerates were 
also the factors used when evaluating Bertelsmann’s positioning in the global arena. The next 
section presents the views, based largely on Bertelsmann’s unique nature, on how these 
characteristics influence the company’s performance. 
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Category I.III. Uniqueness and global ambitions 
 
The interviewees often referred to the private ownership, decentralized management, and 
German-ness when evaluating Bertelsmann’s current performance and the signals the 
company has sent out about its future strategic objectives in the international media 
environment. In this regard, however, the interviewees’ opinions did not carry the relative 
consensus of the previous two categories and instead fell into two opposing camps. One 
opinion, expressed in strongest terms by Stephan Sieprath, Richard Gershon, and Everette 
Dennis, suggested that the way those unique characteristics are employed by the company 
could be seen as strong indicators of Bertelsmann’s continuing global top-tier ambitions. On 
the other hand, Wall Street Journal’s Matthew Karnitschnig and University of North Texas’ 
professor, Alan Albarran tended to see Bertelsmann’s uniqueness and the company’s 
behavior as more limited in scope. Additionally, Karnitschnig took the most critical view of 
Bertelsmann, as he saw the company already sending out signals that it is pulling back from  
global competition. 
For Stephan Sieprath, the decentralized nature of Bertelsmann allows the company to 
move “very, very fast” forward with new initiatives and projects and this, combined with 
Bertelsmann’s commitment to growing both organically and through acquisitions, is a factor 
contributing to the company’s continued growth.  On a similar note, Richard Gershon 
suggested that while allowing a great degree of freedom, Bertelsmann’s corporate 
headquarters requires accountability and exercises corporate authority that is aimed at further 
development. 
Richard Gershon: Very distinct about this company [is] that they’re really willing to 
allow these companies to more or less operate autonomously. And yet at the same time I 
think it’s interesting that even though this happens, there is a real accountability. I mean 
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that “you go ahead, BMG, and do your thing in the United States musically and 
otherwise, but you’re accountable for making sure that you meet your targets financial 
and otherwise.” 
 
Fordham University’s Everette Dennis noted that Bertelsmann has the advantage of acting 
in the global media marketplace as a private company that does not have to worry about 
shareholder value and quarterly profits as much as a public company must. Therefore 
Bertelsmann can be, and also has been, much more methodical and makes investments in 
enterprises that don’t have to pay off immediately. He added, though, that this capability of 
being bold does not mean private companies, including Bertelsmann, always are bold. For 
Dennis:  
    Bertelsmann was particularly out of the box in that period of the late ‘90s to 2002 or 
… ’03, in a way that some other privately held companies were not. Sometimes privately 
held companies are very conservative about what they do. But then they have the 
stability that if they want to make investments, significant ones, and not worry too much 
about the immediate returns, they will. On the other hand, … they’re not usually the first 
company to go out and be an innovator. They could, they have more capability to do it, 
but they don’t always, of course. 
 
Dennis’ notion about Bertelsmann’s apparently proactive approach and its relationship to 
private ownership was further supported by Richard Gershon, who noted that: 
    The problem with Bertelsmann, I think, is [private ownership is] both its strength and 
its weakness. It’s really a two-edged sword. I think … Bertelsmann as a whole is a very 
well managed company, but it’s also a little bit parochial…. Maybe “stuffy,” maybe just 
a little bit. A little bit more traditional, because it is family. It is a little bit more private. 
It isn’t quite feeling the pressures of the public, in a market, as dramatically as some of 
these other companies. 
 
Compared to those positive evaluations of Bertelsmann’s positioning, Matthew 
Karnitschnig was critical towards Bertelsmann’s situation and the company’s positioning 
compared to the other media conglomerates. For Karnitschnig, “nobody else really does book 
clubs [and with] the whole Arvato [printing and service-providing business] they don’t really 
compete with any group.” Acknowledging that Bertelsmann’s current positioning has kept 
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the company profitable and may do so in the future, Karnitschnig countered Gershon’s view 
about the company’s corporate decisions made at their headquarters in a small German town 
far from the media industry metropolises, referred to in the previous subsection, in the 
context of how to position a media conglomerate, because: 
    if you’re sitting in Gütersloh making decisions about what people are going to want to 
see or read, or whatever, I just don’t think that’s necessarily the right place…. You need 
to have some creative solutions in the media world now, I think, to confront all these 
issues, and I just wonder if they are really attuned to that, and I don’t think that they are. 
 
Additionally, Matthew Karnitschnig saw disadvantages in Bertelsmann’s international 
nature and strong connection to the European market, because producing contents for 
different markets in Europe in different languages is expensive and all formats do not travel 
very well. He also pointed to the fact that Bertelsmann’s television arm RTL generally 
doesn’t have majority stakes in various affiliates within the RTL Group because of the legal 
restrictions in several markets. 
Providing a similar critical tone to Karnitschnig’s, Robert Picard, who has observed 
Bertelsmann for about 20 years, offered a counter-argument for the benefits of private 
ownership in the context of the company’s positioning. Picard suggested that Bertelsmann’s 
private ownership has created conservativism in the company and it has lead to a “culture in 
which business units and firms are run independently with separate incentives that reduce the 
ability of the firm to seek performance benefits across operations.” 
Less harsh in criticism and acknowledging the success Bertelsmann has enjoyed in 
creating the world’s biggest book publishing group in Random House, Alan Albarran saw as 
a “pitfall,” Bertelsmann’s inability to achieve comparable growth in areas with higher profit 
margins. As Albarran noted, Bertelsmann has: 
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    not been able to move out of, or expand [television and New Media] operations out of 
the European region, and in particular the Western European region, into the rest of the 
world…. So, in terms of where the bigger money is, let’s say, which tends to be 
television, filmed entertainment, sound recording to a lesser degree, they have not been 
able to achieve that level of expansion that some of the other bigger players have, who 
have had a lot of success about going into different regions. 
 
The interviewees’ consensus on the overall unique nature of the company and opposing 
views on the implications of this uniqueness built the ground for the fourth subcategory, 
evaluating whether the company is signaling its intent of remaining a global top tier media 
conglomerate. The results in this subcategory are presented next. 
Category I.IV. Does the company wish to be a leading global player? 
 
The fourth subcategory describes the outside observers’ impressions and understanding of 
the management style of the company since Thomas Middelhoff left in 2002. The discussions 
on the subject of Thomas Middelhoff’s departure and the company’s performance under 
Gunter Thielen’s leadership aimed to evaluate whether the managerial practices indicate the 
company’s commitment to being a top-tier media conglomerate. The answers presented in 
this subsection also form the core of the discussion concentrating on the first research 
question in the next chapter. 
Somewhat of an exception with his answers compared to eight other interviewees was 
Stephan Sieprath, Bertelsmann AG’s corporate development executive, whose comments 
should be viewed as those of an insider. His comments, acknowledging the restrictions a 
person may have when speaking about his employer, were nevertheless to a large extent 
comparable with the answers by other interviewees. 
The instances from interviews in this subcategory clearly indicate that there is a consensus 
on Bertelsmann’s past commitment to strengthening its global presence during Thomas 
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Middelhoff’s reign. Similarly, the interviewees’ responses by and large suggest that the new 
CEO Gunter Thielen is less prominent in the public eye. The opinions differed, however, 
when interpreting the message conveyed by the lesser publicity about the company’s future 
global ambitions. There was also no clear consensus whether Bertelsmann’s current strategic 
orientation sets the company in a preferred position or at a disadvantage compared to its 
direct competitors and industry peers.   
Bozena Mierzejewska presented the most optimistic view when evaluating the company’s 
strategic management under Gunter Thielen. She acknowledged that while Thomas 
Middelhoff “was that sort of visionary who had very clear ideas about how to enter into 
Electronic Age,” it could nevertheless not be argued that under Gunter Thielen’s leadership 
the company lacks such vision. In Mierzejewska’s view: 
Mr. Thielen’s … vision maybe is less, or his direction is less of a[n] expansion into 
completely unknown areas, and rather building on “what we have” and adapting the 
strategy of the traditional divisions to new changes…. [But] just as an example for you 
that not only the traditional back-to-business is important for Bertelsmann, it looks like 
they’re also trying to invest in search engine technologies and to integrate them into 
television stations. 
 
Similarly, Richard Gershon referred to Bertelsmann’s music arm, BMG’s joint venture 
with Sony, as a sign of the company’s commitment to remain a successful global media 
enterprise after the departure of Thomas Middelhoff, whom Gershon described as “a very 
creative … and very forward-thinking” person. For Gershon, the Sony BMG joint venture  
“says something about [Bertelsmann’s] commitment to understanding how to do music better 
and distribute better.” 
Contrasting such positive views on Bertelsmann’s clear strategic orientation and visionary 
leadership were Ann Hollifield and Matthew Karnitschnig, although the conclusions of 
Hollifield and Karnitschnig’s assessments were different. To Hollifield, Bertelsmann’s 
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strategic management is different from the other global conglomerates such as Disney, News 
Corporation, or Time Warner in that there does not seem to be a clear “meta-strategy” that is 
pursued by Bertelsmann. Yet for Hollifield, the apparent lack of a clear meta-strategy is not 
necessarily a hindrance to the success. On the other hand, Karnitschnig saw the company as 
lacking visionary ideas under the leadership of Gunter Thielen and this is a disadvantage for 
the company. The excerpts of such views by the two respondents, similar in describing the 
situation, but adversarial in assessment, are presented below. 
Ann Hollifield: When I look at the other global behemoths, I can identify clear … meta-
strategies that the companies, by and large, are pursuing. And in Bertelsmann, I’ve never 
really been able to see, what their meta-strategy is…. It may be that the [Mohn] family is 
not pursuing a meta-strategy per se for the long-term, that they’re really pursuing more 
limited goals with the profits they have…. If Bertelsmann doesn’t have a meta-strategy 
that is evident to me, that doesn’t mean it doesn’t have a meta-strategy. But even more 
than that, I’m not sure that’s necessarily a bad thing. 
 
Matthew Karnitschnig: The people making decisions at the top, they’re, you know, like 
Thielen--he’s a very nice guy and good businessman, [but] he’s not really a media 
person…. He ran the printing business … and his successor [Hartmut Ostrowski] … also 
comes from the printing business. So where are the sort of great visionary ideas about 
the media … business. And I think … you need somebody to help envision about where 
he wants to take this company, about how the media world is going to look. Somebody 
who’s going to be able to take risks or allowed to take risks. 
 
To a certain extent, supporting Karnitschnig’s criticism was Robert Picard, to whom “one 
sees less flamboyant leadership, fewer major mergers and acquisitions, and a loss of industry 
leadership” in the management strategies of Bertelsmann after the departure of Thomas 
Middelhoff. But Picard added that such scaling back is not very different from the processes 
going on in Time Warner and Vivendi Universal, for example. Three other interviewees 
shared the view that Bertelsmann, like other major conglomerates, is cautious when entering 
into new acquisitions and the company thoroughly explores new ventures and their fit into 
the existing portfolio before making any moves. 
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Bertelsmann’s Stephan Sieprath also referred to the similarities between Bertelsmann and 
its global competitors in this aspect, because of the cost reduction programs in other major 
media companies. In addition, Sieprath argued that Bertelsmann has in fact been unique in 
that it was the first major conglomerate to already adopt new growth initiatives in 2003.  
In sum, thus, the respondents’ views on Bertelsmann’s recent actions and strategic 
orientation were coherent to a considerable degree in acknowledging the lesser degree of 
“flamboyancy” in industry leadership, to use Robert Picard’s word choice. Several 
respondents also agreed that Bertelsmann is not alone in scaling back its outward activities in 
recent years. There were different opinions in this group of nine people, however, on how 
this new strategic orientation has prepared the company for future challenges and where the 
company may find itself in the future. These opinions were the basis for constructing the 
framework for answering the second research question about Bertelsmann’s future outlook. 
The results forming this framework are presented in the next section of this chapter. 
Category II. Bertelsmann’s future in the global media environment 
 
The following section presents the interviewees’ responses to the questions asked about 
Bertelsmann’s future in the global media marketplace. Some of the subcategories and the 
responses forming those subcategories are closely linked to the subcategories in the previous 
section. This is because I asked the respondents to look at Bertelsmann’s future in the same 
terms of its present, not in an isolated space, but in comparison to its peers and competitors 
and other actors in the global media environment.  
The structure of the framework presented by this category is similar to the first major 
category that evaluated Bertelsmann’s current performance and actions. First, I present the 
respondents’ views on the overall future outlooks of the media industry. The second 
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subsection addresses the technology challenge in particular and the third part of this section 
presents respondents' evaluations and speculations on whether Bertelsmann’s chosen 
approach, outlined with the help of the first main category, will bring success. 
Category II.I. High degree of uncertainty facing all media 
 
All respondents  described the future of the global media marketplace in similar terms. 
Again, there was consensus between interviewees when looking at the broadest level of the 
state of affairs and this is best described by two related terms: uncertainty and technology 
challenge. Some sample responses describing perhaps the greatest uncertainty ever, in which 
all media organizations find themselves, are presented below: 
Alan Albarran: It’s a very interesting time, because there’s a lot of uncertainty and more 
uncertainty I think than there ever has been about the future of the media business…. I 
talk to people all the time in the business, at least locally, and they’re all saying “we’re 
trying to find the business model. We don’t know what it is, you know, and we don’t 
know how to make that business model work.” But they’re all agreeing that they can’t 
continue to do business the same way they have been doing business. 
 
Ann Hollifield: In the 30 years that I’ve been associated with the media, there’s never 
been a period anything like this. And the uncertainty levels are escalating with every 
year, not declining. And so I think almost anybody would hesitate to try to look into a 
crystal ball and say what the future holds, because every single month there’s some new 
breaking story or item that really calls into question your assumptions from the month 
before. 
 
Matthew Karnitschnig: The whole industry is in sort of … at a strange crossroads now, 
and there [are] all kinds of different influences there, and nobody really knows, how 
things are going to look in five years. 
 
Richard Gershon used an analogy from the 1980s to illustrate the difficulties faced by the 
media companies in finding a right strategy for those challenges: 
    One of the interesting things when you’re a company doing media is that it’s like 
called “the problem of being first,” because sometimes being the first doesn’t necessarily 
ensure your success…. Sony has been there on a number of occasions--Sony was the 
first, for example, to demonstrate high definition TV in the United States in 1985 or ’86. 
And by rights they were the first to really demonstrate its possibilities. And even though 
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it made a very impressive splash, as far as its possibilities, it would take twenty plus 
years for high definition TV to really finally take hold in the United States, and today 
Sony isn’t even a player, as far as HD is concerned, in the United States. 
 
Terms mentioned by the interviewees that cause this uncertainty were fragmentation, 
finding strategies for coping with technology and Internet related challenges, competition, 
media abundance, declining return per title and channel, saturated domestic markets, and the 
content’s orientation toward the western world. These reasons represent the general 
consensus among the interviewees about the current challenges in the overall media 
marketplace. 
The responses provided less unanimous opinions when addressing the structure and overall 
picture of this global marketplace in the near-term future. These differences were not major, 
however, and focused mainly on particular details of the challenges faced by existing media 
conglomerates. In addition, Alan Albarran referred to some positive developments in the 
current environment in terms of gradual improvement in revenues since 2003.  
There was also some variation in answers when evaluating the role of New Media 
companies in shaping the global media marketplace, but there was general consensus that the 
main challenge is related to two factors, producing content to fragmented audiences and 
delivering the content in a financially effective way. The particular challenges faced by 
Bertelsmann and its competitors, especially the established media conglomerates as 
compared to the emerging media organizations, were identified in responses that formed the 
second subcategory in this section. 
Category II.II. Technology challenges  
 
In discussions with the interviewees focusing on uncertainties, almost everyone 
acknowledged the difficulty or even the impossible nature of identifying future sure trends in 
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the media industry, as illustrated by some of the responses presented on the previous two 
pages. There were some potential areas, however, where the respondents saw the media 
companies focusing their energy and trying to address the challenges posed by technology. In 
addition to the traditional transnational media conglomerates, prominent New Media 
companies, Amazon, eBay, Google, Yahoo, were also brought into the picture. 
The respondents presented two possible alternatives of how the media marketplace may be 
influenced by the technology challenge, and those alternatives, producing content for the 
fragmented markets and delivering that content profitably, are not mutually exclusive. Those 
two factors identified as key challenges shaping the media industry in the future were 
described by Bertelsmann’s Stephan Sieprath in the following terms: 
    Certainly there could be other companies, I mean if you look at two or three years 
ago, there was no Google or Yahoo joining that kind of the major, let’s say the top ten 
media groups. But nowadays they are, and … certainly one of the trends is that I think 
they’re growing much, developing much more, much quicker and that Internet 
companies are certainly taking a pie of the market…. I think what we would see is a 
mixture of old and new economies. I very much believe that in five or ten years time, 
people will still read books the way they … do these days. They will certainly use media 
like music. The question is, what is going to be the music source … but they still will 
use music. And so … I think if you are in the content business, I think you don’t need to 
worry too much about the situation. 
 
Matthew Karnitschnig offered a similar prediction, the importance of content and its online 
distribution, on  future trends. Karnitschnig also identified video content as the key in 
content, because to him: 
    It’s clear that … the future growth is going to come in some sort of online-related 
video sphere. I think that’s what we do know, we’re going to be … sort of Internet 
television and … that’s why [we see] Time Warner trying to do stuff with AOL, which 
also it owns. And you have Google doing deals to get the content, and all of these things 
that are happening now. 
 
This view about the importance of content and finding effective ways to deliver content, 
especially video content, serves as an example of the relative consensus among the 
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interviewees about the future of the media marketplace. As with the first main category 
trying to position Bertelsmann strategically among its peers, the general picture with related 
challenges and opportunities was seen mainly in similar terms. But the opinions differed 
considerably when asked to evaluate how Bertelsmann will perform in tackling those 
challenges and grasping the opportunities. The third and final subsection of this chapter 
presents the participants’ responses to the questions asking to evaluate what the future holds 
for Bertelsmann in the current global environment. 
Category II.III. Bertelsmann’s future 
 
This subcategory combines the responses from the discussion that asked the interviewees 
to present their views on how Bertelsmann will perform in the media marketplace with its 
challenges and current level of uncertainty. As was already emerging from the other main 
category and its subcategories, the respondents answers did not produce a consensus, but 
provided me with a dichotomous range where the interviewee working for the company was 
on the positive end of the spectrum and the Wall Street Journal journalist on the side marked 
by dim colors.  Stephan Sieprath’s optimism about Bertelsmann’s future was, although not in 
as strong terms, supported by three other interviewees. At least one respondent saw 
Bertelsmann facing similar threats to those articulated by Karnitschnig, and another pointed 
out similar potential factors of concern regarding the company’s future. 
For Sieprath, Bertelsmann’s strength in content, particularly publishing, and commitment 
to media services through Arvato business unit are two main drivers for revenue growth in 
the future. The same business segments were also brought up by Matthew Karnitschnig as 
examples of why Bertelsmann is not a well-prepared media company for the future. 
Karnitschnig’s views were,  to a certain extent, supported by Robert Picard and Alan 
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Albarran, who saw Bertelsmann’s strong reliance on print as posing challenges for the 
company.  
Stephan Sieprath: The businesses itself, the content business … that’s what it’s all about. 
Content business is still a very good business to be into. If you looked at some media, 
like if you look at Dan Brown, for example, he published Da Vinci Code and then three 
or four other books. He sold some 40 million books, and it doesn’t really matter, whether 
it’s going to be a hardcover or a soft cover, or even an e-book, it’s still going to be the 
content that’s going to be sold. And I think that is what we are extremely strong in, 
because we have a lot of creative potential, and our creative artists are the ones that are 
driving revenue. 
 
Matthew Karnitschnig: I don’t think people are going to start reading magazines more 
than they are now, or they’re not going to all of a sudden start subscribing to book clubs, 
or reading more books than they do. I mean [Bertelsmann has] got some serious issues, 
and I don’t think that they have any answers to them, except that they’re looking at 
Arvato. That doesn’t mean that [Bertelsmann] won’t be a profitable business, a stable 
business, but I just don’t think that they’re going to be sort of a major factor in the global 
media, or accepted in books maybe, … because Random house is still big and Gruner [+ 
Jahr]. 
 
Alan Albarran noted that during Thomas Middelhoff’s leadership, Bertelsmann tried to 
establish a much stronger presence worldwide and enter into ventures outside the core 
competencies. But, because some of those New Media ventures did not turn out well, the 
company replaced Middelhoff and Bertelsmann has not been able to move significantly 
beyond publishing and this is going to be one of the company’s challenges. Nevertheless, 
Albarran was not as critical as Karnitschnig, because he saw Bertelsmann as still being a very 
strong company, whose strength in publishing is one of the guarantees that keeps 
Bertelsmann  one of the major global players. 
Similarly to Albarran, Robert Picard viewed Bertelsmann as remaining in the top-tier of 
media conglomerates at least in the near-term future, but being more focused on Europe than 
other leading companies and having a stronger tie to publishing. However, Picard added a 
note of caution based on the fact that Bertelsmann is apparently acquisition adverse at the 
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moment, which may limit the company’s opportunities in broadcasting and New Media in the 
mid-term future and push the company into the second tier of global players. But Picard went 
on to note that while this would be highly undesirable for a publicly funded company, being 
in a second tier globally is not a terrible position for a privately held firm. Picard also added 
that strategies can change over time and that the strategies five or ten years from today may 
be quite different from the current ones. 
While three interviewees were addressing some particular threats Bertelsmann faces in the 
future media marketplace and one of them, Matthew Karnitschnig, was rather critical in 
terms of looking at Bertelsmann as a media company, Stephan Sieprath from Bertelsmann 
was not alone in seeing the outlook for Bertelsmann as a media company in a positive light. 
Richard Gershon, who described Bertelsmann as one of the best-managed media companies 
in the world, used Bertelsmann’s joint venture with Sony in the music business as providing 
it with a positive outlook:  
    I think Bertelsmann will probably take a play out of the Sony handbook as far as how 
to [make the Internet work financially], because Sony has long understood that if you 
want to market hardware, you have to sort of tie it with software. There’s a value owning 
both media software as well as hardware properties. Bertelsmann has not historically 
been in consumer electronics, but I think they understand that they have to have some 
involvement with hardware, and what form that takes, remains to be seen. But I have a 
feeling that they’re going to get their hands around that sort of thing. And I think … 
they’re well positioned in the years ahead.  
 
Among other interviewees who looked at Bertelsmann’s future outlook in a positive way 
was Everette Dennis, who considered the company as having a “very creative and adroit 
footprint” in business operations and he was confident that Bertelsmann remains proactive in 
the global markets, probably just less in the public eye. This belief was also shared by 
Bozena Mierzejewska, who described Bertelsmann as being “very innovative in the online 
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markets” and saw the company growing at a respective rate with its competitors or even 
faster.  
In summary, the second major category with its subcategories, outlined the respondents’ 
views on the current state of affairs in the global media marketplace, the major challenge 
faced by all media companies, and Bertelsmann’s future outlook in light of those challenges. 
While the perception of uncertainty in the media industry was widely supported by almost all 
participants, their responses were fairly uniform in evaluating Bertelsmann’s future financial 
performance. But when it came to evaluating Bertelsmann’s future as that of a media 
company, the prognoses fell into opposing camps. Those findings, together with the results 
presented in the section addressing the first research question, are discussed in the following 
chapter. 
  
CHAPTER V 
Discussion 
 
Based on the background literature and the results section, this chapter aims to analyze the 
findings based on the two research questions in two parts. The division into two follows the 
general build-up of the results chapter, the first part of the discussion looks at the 
interviewees’ responses in light of the literature addressing Bertelsmann’s current strategic 
orientation and the second part of this chapter aims to evaluate, based on those responses, 
what Bertelsmann AG’s future could look like in the current global media environment. 
When interpreting this study’s results and conclusions, the following aspects should be 
kept in mind as the limitations of this project. First, as the current developments in the media 
industry show, any research on the industry focusing on very specific aspects of the global 
communication environment may become outdated quickly because strategies and market 
conditions change rapidly. Nowhere is it more evident than with the most recent reports, 
published only a week before submitting this thesis to the committee in early April, 2006, 
describing Bertelsmann’s potential exit from the music business. 
Second, when interpreting the findings and the conclusions based on those findings it has 
to be remembered that the number of interviewees for this qualitative study was small and 
the time constraints did not allow for additional member checks to follow-up on the 
conclusions. In addition, whether the initial findings and conclusions represent a wider 
understanding of the experts and scholars in the field of global communications and media 
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and industry insiders, can be tested only through supplemental discussions with such 
individuals.  
Acknowledging those limitations, the first section of this chapter discusses the findings in 
light of Sjurts’ (2005) summary on the competition strategies transnational media 
conglomerates, as outlined in Table 2. I chose to analyze the findings based on this model, 
because the four categories of competitive strategies of TNMC’s provide a good setting to 
place the framework and the concepts that emerged from the findings. Additionally, the data 
helped me to position Bertelsmann in the model presented in Figure 1 on the next page, a 
model I constructed partly based on Sjurts’ framework of transnational media corporation 
management. In broad terms, this model looks at a company in the light of theoretical 
conceptions about the management of global media companies, whether the growth strategies 
should be based on aggressive expansion and external growth by seeking stronger integration 
and cross-unit synergies throughout the organization, or does it seem reasonable to adopt a 
more conservative and internally oriented path where success is guaranteed by championing 
and supporting the entrepreneurship of different business units. This model should also serve 
as a tool for viewing any media company, but Bertelsmann in particular, in a wider 
theoretical setting of what the desired or preferred approach should be for a media 
conglomerate, depending on its strategic goals.  
A theoretical construct that one can use for identifying a media conglomerate’s strategic 
management and positioning, presented below, is based on the concepts emerging from the 
literature, particularly from the framework built by Sjurts (2005), to look at and analyze the 
management strategies of media companies. By looking at the company’s positioning in light 
of this model, I attempted to lay the groundwork for a theoretical construction that can be 
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helpful in building a theory for evaluating media conglomerates’ growth perspectives and 
strategic management steps.  
 
Figure 1. Strategic positioning of media companies: structure, behavior, and growth 
strategy. 
 
The second part of the results chapter analyzes the respondents’ answers and the concepts 
which emerged from those answers in light of the challenges Bertelsmann faces in the future, 
referred to in the literature review section. The outline of this subsection is similar to the 
second part of the findings section, as I will address each of the subcategories of category II, 
Bertelsmann’s future in the global media environment. 
Remaining a leading actor globally is not the primary objective 
 
To analyze the respondents’ views on the strategic orientation of Bertelsmann and whether 
the company is indicating its intent to remain one of the leading transnational media 
conglomerates, I looked at the results in light of the competitive strategies summarized by 
Sjurts. Thus, the following discussion analyzes the findings in light of Bertelsmann’s generic 
strategy, strategic behavior and orientation, and internationalization strategy. 
Bertelsmann’s generic or base strategy under the current leadership, emerging from the 
discussions with the interviewees, builds an interesting picture that is a mix of a 
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differentiated and international product portfolio with the strongest position in the company’s 
core markets in Europe, especially in the German speaking parts of Europe. The 
differentiation is evident through the company’s product portfolio and there is a strong 
emphasis on decentralized management. The great liberty granted to the managers of those 
business units can be seen as a factor keeping the company financially healthy.  
At the same time, however, Bertelsmann, under the leadership of Gunter Thielen, seems to 
have reduced the degree of importance of product portfolio related strategic management and 
placed a higher emphasis on the bottom-line figures instead. While financial well-being is 
vital to all business ventures and the need for “being in the black” was emphasized by all 
interviewees, there was no single conclusion to be drawn about the implications of the 
relative conservativism in financial matters. Instead, two different conclusions can be drawn 
in this regard.  
First, “number-crunching” may have been one thing that has kept Bertelsmann successful 
in the international arena and the level of accountability required from the decentralized 
business units has resulted in the company being very strong in its core markets. The strength 
pursued in the core markets, to be a leader and financially successful in every market the 
company acts in, has resulted in strong performance especially in the European markets and 
core industry sectors, like publishing and television. Several of the interviewees appeared to 
indicate that this is the case, that Bertelsmann is exercising a financially solid general 
strategic approach that is strengthening its position as a successful and leading media 
conglomerate. 
A different conclusion about Bertelsmann’s current generic strategy is based on the 
assessments and more critical statements emerging mainly from discussion with Matthew 
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Karnitschnig and the written interview with Robert Picard. These statements suggest that 
Bertelsmann’s strategic management is keeping the company somewhat distanced from the 
global markets. To continue on the lines of such critical assessment, it can be suggested that 
the critics also agree with the notions about Bertelsmann’s financial success and the 
company’s strength in its core business sectors, but that also means pushing the company 
more into a niche player or a financially successful conglomerate with media assets as 
opposed to a global media conglomerate. The company can be seen as operating on the 
sidelines or moving towards becoming a niche player in the sense that Bertelsmann’s revenue 
drivers are publishing with its relatively low margins, a television business in a fragmented 
European market, and income from business services such as call-centers.  
To evaluate Bertelsmann’s strategic behavior in terms of it being defensive and reactive to 
the markets or adopting an innovative approach, the findings suggest that for obvious 
reasons, economic losses and smaller than expected growth ratios, every major conglomerate 
is somewhat defensive currently. While defensive or reactive traits are evident, the findings 
also indicate that Bertelsmann has great opportunities, due to its private ownership and 
resulting freedom from shareholder pressure, to pursue an innovative strategy or innovative 
strategies in the global market. Yet, as illustrated by Richard Gershon’s apt opinion about the 
private ownership being both Bertelsmann’s strength and weakness, those opportunities are 
not always used. The external conditions forcing Bertelsmann into being more defensive 
may, in combination with the nature of the company, have resulted in transforming from an 
“out of the box” industry leader into someone with less willingness to dive into innovative 
solutions and taking related risks. 
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The fact that Bertelsmann is not among the leaders when it comes to innovation is, of 
course, not a reason to deplore the company’s strategic management per se. On the contrary, 
Bertelsmann’s reliance on solid financial accountability and its “down to earth” approach 
may well reflect its belief of the “problems of being first” and the lessons learned from  
history where the innovator may eventually not turn out to be the most successful company. 
Looking at this approach based on the first research question of this study, however, the 
findings suggest that being one of the biggest media conglomerates is not as important to 
Bertelsmann as being on financially solid ground. 
Looking at the third strategic dimension and evaluating whether Bertelsmann is building 
its strategy on external or internal growth, it is evident from both the background literature 
and the discussions with the interviewees, that the company currently gives preference to 
organic and internal growth ahead of external growth through acquisition. Again, 
Bertelsmann is not too different in this regard from at least some of its competitors, some of 
whom witnessed serious setbacks in recent years. But the interviews did indicate that such 
reliance on operational growth might not be sufficient for achieving the level of expansion of 
some other global media conglomerates.  
Therefore it can be argued that the company may face the dangers of becoming a niche 
player in a global sense through its reliance on the organic growth in core markets, 
particularly in Europe. On the other hand, given the difficulties media conglomerates faced 
after the consolidation stage of the late 1990s and the losses it brought to the shareholders of 
public media corporations, the apparent strategic choice at the current moment to prefer 
organic growth is very reasonable. The potential problem here is the fact that with its 
conservative and reactive strategic behavior, the company may find itself in a 
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disadvantageous position when faced with the challenges of finding new areas for growth in 
the fragmented and saturated (core) markets. 
Bertelsmann has stated as one of its goals to be a market leader in every international 
market it is active in and several interviewees described the company as the most 
international company of the leading transnational media conglomerates. Given also the 
decentralized nature of Bertelsmann, it is reasonable to suggest that the company’s strategic 
orientation continues to be what Sjurts identified as multinational, establishing subsidiaries or 
joint ventures abroad and following local management strategies in these ventures. A 
decentralized nature allows the company to be successful in various markets around the 
world and as the company has repeatedly emphasized the importance of its international 
operations, the company’s strategic management thus clearly indicates Bertelsmann’s 
continued ambitions to remain a leading global media company in this regard.  
At the same time, however, Bertelsmann is committed to meeting the targets for profits 
and the company has a relatively strong orientation towards European markets. As Matthew 
Karnitschnig pointed out, it is more expensive for Bertelsmann to distribute its content in 
Europe than it would be to do so in the United States, which is the biggest single media 
market in the world. Thus, an international strategy of being a leader in every market where 
the company has a presence may result in further strengthening of the core businesses of 
publishing, book and music clubs, and TV in Europe. But due to the smaller presence, 
especially in the sectors with high profit margins, in the United States, this strategy may also 
distance the company from the global leaders and create favorable conditions for a strong 
second tier conglomerate.  
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When looking at Bertelsmann’s positioning in terms of the model presented in Figure 1 
above, the company’s current approach best fits into the “box” of conservative, internal 
growth oriented strategy and decentralized management. Positioning Bertelsmann or any 
other media conglomerate into this model does not mean, of course, that the borders are very 
clear-cut, similar to the borders in the figure. For example, it probably cannot be said about 
any media company that it is not innovative at all or it looks only for external growth 
opportunities, or that it doesn’t allow its business units any operational freedom. Instead, this 
model can be used for evaluating the general strategic orientation of a company, while 
remembering that any single identifying characteristic may be a mix of those dichotomous 
identifiers. 
To sum up the above, the interviewees and the existing literature on the subject suggest 
that while being one of the top global media conglomerates has been important to 
Bertelsmann, its primary strategic objective is profitability and leadership in the established 
core areas of competency. As I have stated multiple times above, those two strategic goals 
are not mutually exclusive. But depending on the market situation and developments, the 
primary objective of financial soundness can push Bertelsmann out from the global top tier of 
the media industry. And according to Robert Picard, being pushed out of the leading group 
would be highly undesirable for a public company, but it is not a terrible position for a 
privately owned company.  
It remains to be seen in the future when Bertelsmann’s and its peers’ performance are 
evaluated from a historical perspective, whether such assessments or suggestions turned out 
to be true and whether it is possible to use the strategic positioning model for evaluating 
future success of this or any other media company. For additional speculations and 
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suggestions on Bertelsmann’s future that can be reviewed for accuracy in the future, the next 
section of this chapter analyzes the potential outlook for Bertelsmann with its current 
strategy.  
The future looks promising in financial terms 
 
After suggesting that the orientation Bertelsmann has taken in the global media market is 
directed primarily towards solid financial results and being a leading global media 
conglomerate in size is not a target in itself, I will analyze the respondents’ views on 
Bertelsmann’s success in the future. This discussion intends to come up with a conclusion, 
what Bertelsmann’s arguably defensive and less innovative strategic orientation means in 
terms of the company’s future performance. 
The current great degree of uncertainty, largely present because of the challenges posed by 
new technologies faced by all media, was evident from both the background literature and 
the interviews with the people familiar with the industry. This uncertainty is probably also a 
factor when looking at the findings related to the first research question about the strategic 
objectives of Bertelsmann. And while some interviewees’ conclusions were different from 
mine in this regard, there was almost unanimous agreement on the part of the interviewees 
that the way Bertelsmann is managed can be seen as a key to future financial success. 
It was almost surprising how participants with different assessments on how to evaluate 
Bertelsmann’s behavior and strategic orientation as a leading transnational media 
conglomerate, emphasized their belief of Bertelsmann’s financial success. In light of a period 
of uncertainty about the future that, according to the background literature and expressed by 
the interviewees, is the greatest in decades, there was a remarkable unity among the 
interviewees in evaluating Bertelsmann’s outlook. In short, therefore, the answer to the 
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second research question is firmly positive. In other words, the interviewees strongly 
indicated that Bertelsmann is managed in a way that has a high potential for producing 
favorable results in the current global environment. 
In addition to the general belief regarding Bertelsmann’s outlook, there are a few things to 
note that relate to such financial success. First, and this relates back to the findings under the 
first research question, compared to its peers, Bertelsmann’s strength lies traditionally in 
sectors with lower margins and in smaller, more fragmented markets compared to the U.S. 
conglomerates with strong presence in the United States. This in turn may mean that 
Bertelsmann will be underperforming in terms of market expectations for growth, as 
compared to the other global conglomerates. But again, referring to Robert Picard’s notion, 
being potentially pushed into the second tier of media companies in terms of size is not a 
terrible position for a private company at all.  
The second observation from the interviews is the relative unity in evaluating 
Bertelsmann’s readiness to face current challenges and find successful business models. With 
the exception of generally critical Matthew Karnitschnig, other interviewees suggested that 
Bertelsmann’s uniqueness and good management practices have prepared the company well 
for facing the challenges in the sectors it is operating. The best example to support this 
argument is a thought expressed by Richard Gershon who saw Bertelsmann being ready to 
learn the lessons about how the others in the industry have succeeded. Several other 
interviewees also expressed Gershon’s belief and this indicates that Bertelsmann is at least by 
this group of interviewees seen as being able to develop successful business models in the 
sectors it is active in.  
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In light of its readiness to meet the general challenges faced by the media, and this has 
mostly to do with challenge posed by “disruptive technology,” as labeled by Ann Hollifield, 
Bertelsmann’s competitive outlook in this regard can also be addressed. Several interviewees 
referred to the challenge posed to traditional media conglomerates by the New Media 
companies, whose competencies lay mainly in infrastructure and distribution of the content at 
the moment. However, nearly everyone agreed that future success will still depend on the 
quality of the content and therefore the media conglomerates must find ways to deliver that 
content to the audiences. In the case of Bertelsmann, there again seemed to be general 
consensus in that the company will find the most financially effective ways to deliver its 
creative products to the consumer.  
It was somewhat surprising, how positively most of the interviewees saw the outlook for 
Bertelsmann given the prominence of skepticism in the secondary sources, especially in the 
news media, when discussing the global media conglomerates’ future in light of the 
challenges posed by the marketplace. Possible reasons why the interviewees had such a 
positive conception may include Bertelsmann’s solid financial performance throughout its 
history, relatively strong performance compared to some other media companies in recent 
turbulent years, and the company’s private status and the lesser degree of scrutiny it may 
have attracted from observers compared to the publicly traded media conglomerates. It can 
also be a combination of those reasons related to the fact that despite a high degree of 
uncertainty, the global media industry’s financial health is somewhat improving compared to 
the turn of the century and therefore the outlook of a historically strong and profitable 
company was also seen in positive light.  
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Conclusion and suggestions for further research 
 
The dominant theme emerging from discussions with a small group of experts in the field 
suggested that Bertelsmann’s current strategic positioning illustrates the company’s strong 
commitment to its core markets and industry sectors. Another theme emerging from the 
literature and the interviews is the company’s emphasis on organic growth and Bertelsmann’s 
strong decentralized business culture. In the model I constructed during this study, presented 
in Figure 1, Bertelsmann is placed as a conglomerate that is internal growth orientated; the 
company is decentralized, and has a predominantly conservative business strategy. 
The findings also suggested that Bertelsmann, declaring itself as aiming to command the 
leading status in the markets it operates, is not primarily targeting to remain in the top 
echelon of global media companies if retaining this position results in weaker than desired 
financial results. That conclusion led the way for evaluating the future outlook or speculating 
on the outlook and the experts helping to conduct this study saw the future for Bertelsmann 
generally in positive terms. On the other hand, while the future was seen as positive in regard 
to the financial health of the company, the interviewees’ opinions were not consensual in 
evaluating whether financial strength to a considerable extent in industry sectors with lower 
margins and with more exposure to fragmented markets in Europe would be desired for other 
companies with different characteristics, mainly companies that, unlike Bertelsmann, are 
listed on the stock markets. 
The findings of this study indicated that given the current degree of uncertainty facing the 
media, it is extremely difficult to assess what strategic approach could be the best generic 
recommendation for the media companies worldwide. Similarly there was no clear-cut recipe 
emerging from the limited number of interviews that would be helpful in analyzing the 
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degree of success media companies achieve in their quest for a winning strategy. However, 
the discussions with the experts provided a consensual view on Bertelsmann’s future outlook 
in that the company appears very well positioned and managed to deliver solid financial 
results. But there were also thoughts expressed by the interviewees that the current approach 
may result in Bertelsmann’s future growth being outperformed by media conglomerates with 
better exposure to industry sectors with higher profit margins and a stronger presence in the 
biggest single media market in the western world, the United States.  
On the other hand, it may be possible to look at privately owned Bertelsmann as a strong 
media conglomerate that has managed to keep the company profitable during the turbulent 
years of the early 21st Century with a strategic approach that considers strength in one’s core 
competency areas, individual decision-making power at the business unit level, and solid 
financial results being superior to the mere size of the company. Those characteristics were 
also a basis for placing Bertelsmann in the model constructed for this study. It remains to be 
analyzed in the course of future research, whether a strategy carrying those characteristics, 
internal orientation, decentralized management, and a conservative approach to resource 
allocation, turns out to be a winning one in an environment where the media is struggling to 
come to terms with challenges posed by the revolutionary developments in technology. Thus 
further research should be conducted to assess whether the model constructed for this study 
may be used effectively in positioning any media company in terms of its strategic 
orientation and whether this positioning is helpful in speculating over the future potential of 
those companies.  
With all of the results presented in the previous chapter and the discussion based on those 
findings, it must be remembered that all but one of the interviewees were people evaluating 
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the questions about a particular company in the global media marketplace as outsiders. 
Additionally, the questions asked the interviewees were often general in nature, because of 
the way the research questions were stated and because most of the interviewees’ 
specialization was not Bertelsmann in particular, questions related to specific aspects of 
Bertelsmann’s management and growth opportunities may have been left unasked and may 
thus not be reflected in the results. Those questions could be partially answered through 
follow-up member checks to test whether my interpretations of the interviewees’ answers 
fully reflect the idea conveyed. As such member checks were not conducted due to time 
constraints, this acts as a major limitation in interpreting any of the findings and should be 
considered as terminus a quo for further research on the subject. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. German firms’ investments in the U.S. 1980-2005 
Year 
New 
investment in 
$ millions 
1980    1,777  
1981    1,687  
1982    1,259  
1983    1,325  
1984    1,182  
1985    2,148  
1986    5,315  
1987    4,326  
1988    5,288  
1989    3,839  
1990    4,681  
1991    5,237  
1992    4,988  
1993    2,995  
1994    3,819  
1995    9,912  
1996    9,069  
1997    8,797  
1998    40,586  
1999    20,028  
2000    27,697  
2001    52,060  
2002    21,366  
2003    12,285  
2004    12,637  
2005    6,127  
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
Note: Until the end of 1998, the German Bundesbank presented data in German Marks (DM), 
from 1999 the data are given in euros (€). For purposes of comparison, yearly investment in 
US dollars is calculated by using the following year’s first bank day’s (i.e. January 2, 1998, 
for the year of 1997) the official exchange rate as published by the Deutsche Bundesbank and 
the European Central Bank respectively. While this calculation is an artificial creation by the 
researcher, it nevertheless gives an indication of the direct investment amounts. 
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Appendix B. Bertelsmann’s organizational structure 
Corporate Development
Committee
Corporate Center
RTL Group
Luxembourg
Broadcasting
27.7% of revenues
Random House Inc
New York
Book Publishing
9.9% of revenues
Gruner + Jahr
Hamburg
Magazine Publishing
14.2% of revenues
BMG
New York
Music Labels and Publishing
11.6% of revenues
Arvato
Gütersloh
Media Services
23.7% of revenues
Direct Group
Gütersloh
Distribution - Clubs and Internet
12.9% of revenues
Bertelsmann AG
(Executive Board)
 
 
Source: Company Website, Annual Report 2005 
Note: The share of divisional revenues from the total revenues is shown before corporate consolidation. 
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Appendix C. Phone interview script 
First, after initial formalities, ask the interviewee to sign the consent form if you are meeting 
with that individual in person. If the signed consent form was obtained via fax or in mail and 
the interview is conducted over telephone, remind the interviewee that he/she has signed a 
written consent and agrees to be a participant in this study. Then start the recording device or 
remind the interviewee that the phone-call will be recorded and follow these steps: 
• State the name of the interviewee, the date, location (if applicable), and the starting 
time of the interview. 
• Ask questions related to demographic and professional background of the 
interviewee: 
o Brief overview of professional career and main research interests. 
o Present position and professional or academic specialization. 
• Ask the interviewee to describe in general terms, what type of research has he/she 
done or is doing in the field of media management and global media economics. Ask 
him/her to discuss briefly the main areas of interest. 
• Ask the interviewee to describe in his or her own words, how could one describe the 
global media landscape, who are the major players in this area, what particular 
characteristics (if any) could one attribute to these major players, and what (if any) 
general trends one could identify in global media environment currently and during 
the last few years. 
• Ask the interviewee to tell you in his or her own words, how familiar is he/she with 
Bertelsmann AG in particular and its operations worldwide, and Bertelsmann’s 
strategic position in global media landscape. 
• If the interviewee did not mention change in leadership in Bertelsmann in 2002, ask if 
he/she is aware of this fact. If yes, then ask him/her to describe in own words what 
may have been the reasons behind this change and how have these changes reflected 
in company’s position and performance within the environment it operates. If the 
interviewee is not aware of this change, inform him/her about some of the reasons 
stated for the departure of Thomas Middelhoff in news media, academic literature and 
corporation’s own published materials. 
• Ask the interviewee, if he/she is familiar with the strategic statements made by 
Bertelsmann AG after 2002 that reflect company’s decision to drop further aggressive 
expansion plans and focus on core business. If the interviewee is familiar with such 
goals, ask him/her to evaluate the perspectives of such strategy and inquire, whether 
the interviewee can evaluate, whether the change in strategy has already produced 
some results. Ask him/her to evaluate also those results.  
• Ask the interviewee to evaluate following statements: 
o Relying on organic growth perspectives in Bertelsmann’s core business and 
only careful expansion through mergers and acquisitions are sufficient to 
ensure company’s successful development and financial well being and the 
company is in no danger to become a global niche-player. 
o Bertelsmann holds such substantial competitive advantages--that are executed 
in an efficient way--in its core business segments that even abolishing 
aggressive expansion strategies will not affect its position as one of the 
leading media companies. 
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• Ask the interviewee to discuss, how do Bertelsmann’s management strategies since 
the departure of Thomas Middelhoff compare to other global media conglomerates. 
Ask the interviewee to find remarkable differences (if any), similarities; what may be 
the reasons for such similarities or differences; how will those similarities and 
differences reflect on companies’ performance in respect to their peers? 
• If the interviewee has not yet touched in detail the impact “dotcom” boom may have 
had on the departure of Bertelsmann’s former CEO, ask his/her views on how the 
expectations and development plans related to new media may have contributed to the 
leadership change. Be sure to ask, whether those decisions made in the end of 1990s 
during boom and beginning of 21st century right after the bubble burst do seem 
justifiable considering the time they were made and also looking those decisions at 
present time. 
• If the interviewee has not brought up the issue of ownership, ask if he/she is aware of 
Bertelsmann’s private ownership and if this has any considerable effect on company’s 
strategic management and performance. Be sure to ask the interviewee to explain 
specifically, how one factor or another related to ownership may influence the 
performance of a company and distinguish privately held company from publicly 
owned firm.  
• Ask the interviewee (unless he/she has done so already), how would he/she evaluate 
Bertelsmann’s current management strategies compared to the strategies advocated 
by the previous CEO and current strategies’ influence on company’s position in the 
market. Be sure to inquire, what factors may change interviewee’s opinion or 
evaluation, and what possible internal or external factors may trigger any such 
scenarios.  
• Ask the interviewee if there is any other issue he/she would like to address regarding 
the topic covered, either in particular or in general terms. Depending on the answer, 
continue discussion on the subject or thank the interviewee again for contributing to 
this research. Also remind him/her once again that while you’re transcribing the 
interview by him/her and by other participants in this study, or while you’re analyzing 
the data gathered, you may contact him/her again for clarifications and potential 
follow-up questions. 
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Appendix D. List of categories 
 
Cat # Category 
description 
Main/ Sub 
I/ Sub II 
Example 
1 Top-tier global media 
conglomerates 
Sub I AA: Pretty much the global landscape is dominated 
by seven companies. 
2 Global New Media 
companies 
Sub II MKe: I think it's unlikely that Google will ever 
develop really significant content competencies…. 
They have obviously a dominance of the Internet 
and a dominance of a lot of distribution 
architectures and I would imagine probably there'll 
be just alliances with people supplying the content. 
3 Bertelsmann is 
unique among top-
tier conglomerates 
Sub I AH: Bertelsmann in my view is … a fairly unique 
company in that pantheon of true global behemoths. 
4 Bertelsmann is 
privately owned - 
positive 
Sub II RG: When you are privately owned, you have a 
certain level of control, as far as your business 
decision-making, that's not true for a publicly traded 
company. 
5 Bertelsmann is 
privately owned - 
negative 
Sub II MKa: I don't think [Bertelsmann has] the financial 
muscle to do the kinds of deals that are going to be 
necessary to create … the kind of growth that 
they've had in the past going forward. 
6 Bertelsmann's current 
performance 
Sub I BM: I think [Bertelsmann] still [has] a solid vision, 
where they are going. 
7 New Economy - 
opportunities 
Sub II RG: Bertelsmann … dived in fairly early into the 
Internet communications as far as seeing value in 
being part of that. 
8 New Economy - 
downturn 
Sub II MKe: [There] was a huge turnover of the big media 
companies chief executives … and a lot of them it 
was to do with the fact that it had got just over 
exuberant in the Internet era. 
9 New Economy - cost 
reduction in 
Bertelsmann 
Sub II SS: Because of the downturn starting in 2001, we 
were, like any other major media company, we were 
kind of having our cost reduction programs. 
10 Bertelsmann's current 
Internet strategy 
Sub II BM: It looks like [Bertelsmann takes] the new 
technology with all the potential and integrates it to 
their core business. 
11 Bertelsmann's 
decentralized 
management - 
positive 
Sub II SS: Decisions are made very quickly and that is … 
very helpful. 
12 Bertelsmann's 
decentralized 
management - 
Sub II SS: Of course, if you have decentralized company, 
there is the potential that they do sometimes 
compete with each other. 
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negative 
13 Future developments 
in the media  
Main SS: The business itself, the content business … 
that's what it's all about. 
14 Current trends in the 
media industry 
Main MKe: obviously technological change and the need 
to respond to the technological change is, I would 
say, is one of the big [trends in media industry] right 
now. 
15 High degree of 
uncertainty in the 
media industry 
Sub I AH: Certainly right now the industry is experiencing 
a high degree of uncertainty about the future, 
including in some of their most profitable and core 
businesses. 
16 The media industry is 
very complex 
Main AH: The global media marketplace is much more 
complex than is usually acknowledged in 
discussions of it. 
17 Meta-strategies of 
top-tier media 
conglomerates 
Sub II AH: I can identify clear, or what appear to me 
anyway, clear meta-strategies that the companies, by 
and large, are pursuing. 
18 Technology 
challenge - 
unpredictable 
Sub I AA: This whole iPod phenomenon is fascinating to 
watch, because it's just another extension of you and 
I and other consumers now having control of when 
we want to access content. 
19 Reasons for 
Middelhoff's 
departure 
Sub II RP: [Change in Bertelsmann's leadership primarily] 
resulted from conflicts between the company culture 
and Thomas Middelhoff. 
20 Bertelsmann's future 
performance 
Sub I RP: [Bertelsmann] still remains a leading global 
player, certainly in the top tier of players, but is 
more focused on Europe than other leading players 
and has a stronger tie strategically to publishing. 
21 The importance of 
Bertelsmann's 
corporate history 
Sub II MKa: [Middelhoff's] strategic moves tended to 
diminish the role of the traditional core publishing 
and music activities, which provided the bulk of the 
funding for the firm. 
Key to names: AA – Alan Albarran 
  AH – Ann Hollifield 
  BM – Bozena Mierzejewska 
  ED – Everette Dennis 
  MKa – Matthew Karnitschnig 
  MKe – Marian Keynes 
  RG – Richard Gershon 
  RP – Robert Picard 
  SS – Stephan Sieprath 
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